This paper presents data on 76 partial credit guarantee schemes across 46 developed and developing countries. Based on theory, we discuss different organizational features of credit guarantee schemes and their variation across countries. We focus on the respective role of government and private sector and different pricing and risk reduction tools and how they are correlated across countries. We find that government has an important role to play in funding and management, but less so in risk assessment and recovery. There is a surprisingly low use of risk-based pricing and limited use of risk management mechanisms.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of two macroprudential policies in Colombia: marginal reserve requirements and dynamic provisions. The first measure was implemented to control excessive credit growth, while the latter was designed to increase systemic resilience by establishing a countercyclical buffer through loan loss provision requirements. To perform this analysis, a rich dataset based on loan-by-loan information for Colombian banks during the 2006–2009 period is used. Our identification strategy closely follows Khwaja & Mian (2008), so that only those observations with multiple banking relations are considered. Estimations are performed applying firm and firm-time fixed effects to control for demand factors, thus appropriately isolating loan demand from credit supply. Results from the econometric model suggest that dynamic provisions, the countercyclical reserve requirement and an aggregate measure of the macroprudential policy stance had a negative effect on credit growth, which varies according to bank and debtor-specific characteristics. Particularly, effects are intensified for riskier debtors, suggesting that the aggregate macroprudential policy stance in Colombia has worked effectively to stabilize credit cycles and reduce risk-taking.

ABSTRACT In collaboration with the Authority for the Financial Markets in the Netherlands, we manipulate the content of official letters that instruct financial intermediaries to submit a mandatory self‐assessment. As part of the Registered Report Process, we submitted our hypotheses, experimental procedure, and planned statistical analyses before data collection. We predicted that a request indicating a supportive regulatory attitude has a positive effect on reporting quality on average. We also predicted this effect to be stronger for small firms and for firms with a long‐term orientation, and to become negative for firms with a short‐term orientation. Planned analyses show that a supportive letter reduced reporting quality unless firms had a long‐term orientation, supporting the moderating influence of time horizon, but providing no support for the expected average effect or for moderation by firm size.