China's financial deregulation has led to the rise of individual-controlled fund management companies, where the largest shareholder is a person rather than an institution. This study examines these mutual funds, known as “individual-controlled funds” (ICFs), particularly from the perspective of potential conflict of interest. ICFs are more likely to prioritize performance given there is limited interference in their activities by affiliated institutions. They consistently outperform peers by 0.7 % per month, after accounting for fund characteristics. This outperformance is more pronounced when the largest individual owner has greater influence in the fund company. We also document the lower propensity of ICFs to engage in misconduct. Our findings demonstrate that minimizing conflicts of interest benefits performance in the mutual fund industry.

In this paper, we investigate value creation by hedge funds using Berk and van Binsbergen's (2015) value-added. We find that, on average, a hedge fund manager extracts $0.76 million per month from the market. We provide strong evidence of persistence in value creation by hedge fund managers. Of three skill indicators—skill ratio, fee ratio, and total compensation—we find that total compensation best identifies the skilled manager out-of-sample. Investors in value-creating funds benefit from a better risk–return payoff. While hedge funds operate in a less competitive market than mutual funds, incentive fees do not indicate greater skill. The value that hedge funds can extract from the market depends on both the profitability and scalability of the investment strategy.