Abstract This paper examines the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees. It draws on the theory that managers of firms with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value‐relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting‐based compensation are likely to use DAs opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation. OLS regression results of 648 Australian firms show that (1) there is a positive association between DAs and audit fees; (2) managerial ownership negatively affects the positive relationship between DAs and audit fees; and (3) this negative impact is further found to be weaker for firms with high accounting‐based management compensation.

The primary goal of this study is to evaluate the ability of the Cross-sectional Jones Model and the Cross-sectional Modified Jones Model to detect earnings management vis-à-vis their time-series counterparts by examining the association between discretionary accruals and audit qualifications. These two cross-sectional models have not been formally evaluated by prior research, and their use may offer certain advantages to investors and researchers over their time-series counterparts. A sample of 173 distinct firms with qualified audit reports and a matched-pair control sample with clean audit reports are used. Only the two cross-sectional models are consistently able to detect earnings management. One limitation of this study is that its findings merely indicate the superiority of the cross-sectional models vis-à-vis their time-series counterparts in an audit qualification setting, not validate either the former or the latter.

Abstract We examine whether the presence of female directors and female audit committee members affect audit quality in terms of audit effort and auditor choice by using observations from a sample of U.S. firms, spanning the years 2001–2011. We find, after controlling for endogeneity and other board, firm, and industry characteristics, that firms with gender‐diverse boards (audit committees) pay 6 percent (8 percent) higher audit fees and are 6 percent (7 percent) more likely to choose specialist auditors compared to all‐male boards (audit committees). Our findings suggest that boards (audit committees) with female directors (members) are likely to demand higher audit quality, ceteris paribus.