This paper examines the effects of over 1,800 U.K. takeovers on shareholder wealth in the period 1955–1985. It shows that around the merger announcement date targets gain 25 to 30 percent and bidders earn zero or modest gains. The U.K. data allow independent tests of many issues addressed in studies of U.S. takeovers. Target gains are higher in the U.K. after 1968, suggesting that increases in U.S. target gains at the same time may not be attributable to the Williams Act. Postmerger share-price performance suggests that acquisitions follow favorable developments in bidder's equity prices.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of Chapter 11 from an empirical examination of thirty firms that have emerged from reorganization. We find the recontracting framework of Chapter 11 to be complex, lengthy, and costly. Violations of absolute priority in favor of stockholders are frequently encountered. These deviations may result from the bargaining process of Chapter 11 or from a recontracting process between creditors and stockholders which recognizes the ability of stockholder‐oriented management to preserve firm value. An example of such recontracting addresses Myers' underinvestment problem. An investigation of the effects of Chapter 11 on the pricing of risky debt is also provided.