AbstractDrawing on contract governance literature and institutional theory, this study investigates the differential effects of output‐ and behavior‐based contract governance on buyer–supplier conflict in supply chains. The authors develop a contingent perspective to examine how institutional factors moderate the impact of contract governance. The findings, from an empirical study of buyer–supplier dyads in China, show that an output‐based contract is negatively, whereas a behavior‐based contract is positively, related to buyer–supplier conflict. The effects of a contract are moderated by two primary institutional factors: legal enforceability and unilateral government support. These findings have important implications for supply chain research, public policy, and managerial practice.

Despite the prominence of the competitive strategy perspective, it remains unclear whether foreign firms entering China can still adopt a differentiation or low-cost position to achieve superior performance, given the unique market and institutional environments in China. Alternatively, should foreign firms follow conventional wisdom and actively build managerial ties with government officials and business community to enhance their performance? This study develops and tests an interactive perspective that highlights the moderating effects of managerial ties on competitive position–performance relationships. The results indicate that though both differentiation and low-cost positions foster foreign firm profitability, the benefit of a differentiation position is conditional on political and business ties in different directions: political ties impede and business ties strengthen the positive effect of a differentiation position on foreign firms' profitability. Moreover, foreign firms benefit from their use of business ties, but their profitability suffers when they rely increasingly on the heavy use of political ties.

AbstractWhile the literature tends to take a dichotomous view of supplier‐induced disruptions, we take a continuum perspective: a buyer perceives a disruption induced by the supplier to varying degrees (i.e., attributing varying levels of responsibility to the supplier), thus affecting the buyer's decisions in switching suppliers. By focusing on the recurrent disruptions, we argue that imputed buyers' attributions of responsibility are characterized by disruptions' recurrent nature and locus of causality—whether the disruptions were repeatedly triggered by recurrent events internal or external to the supplier. Furthermore, while previous studies have identified either buyers' attributions of disruptions or suppliers' justice approaches (to resolve disruptions) as independent factors driving buyers' decisions, we integrate attribution and justice theories and investigate their combined effect—how responsibility attributions affect buyers' switching intentions given suppliers' justice approaches. Using three vignette‐based studies of 705 purchasing managers (supplemented by three robustness check studies), we show that distributive justice attenuates the damaging impact of disruptions triggered by suppliers' internal incidents (internal locus) on buyers' switching intentions, whereas procedural and interactional justice are more instrumental in disruptions triggered by external events (external locus). We conclude by offering substantive guidance for suppliers regarding appropriate actions in preserving the relationship.

Organizational change in emerging economies, although difficult, is inevitable. The authors study the drivers and consequences of organizational changes in an emerging economy, China. The results of a firm-level survey show that organizational changes in technical vs administrative areas are differentially driven by firms' motivation to change (past performance), opportunity to change (firm location and market orientation), and capability to change (firm ownership, managers' change attitude, and leader charisma). Furthermore, technical and administrative changes affect firm performance through distinct paths. Technical changes have a direct, positive impact on performance, whereas administrative changes enhance firm performance indirectly through technical changes, and the effect of administrative changes on performance is strengthened by the presence of a participative culture.