This paper investigates whether so-called anomalous returns predicted by accounting numbers reflect normal returns for risk or abnormal returns. It does so via a model showing how accounting numbers inform about normal returns if pricing were rational. The model equates expected returns to expectations of earnings and earnings growth, so that any variable that forecasts earnings and earnings growth also indicates the required return if the market prices those outcomes as risky. The empirical results confirm that many accounting anomaly variables (such as accruals, asset growth, and investment) forecast forward earnings and growth, and in the same direction in which they forecast returns. While the lack of an agreed-upon asset pricing model for required returns rules out definitive conclusions, the paper provides both a framework and supporting empirical results indicating that the observed “anomalous” returns associated with accounting numbers are consistent with rational pricing.

A major threat to the development of financial markets in emerging markets is “tunneling.” In China, this took on the form of controlling shareholders diverting assets from listed firms or coercing firms to serve as guarantors on questionable loans. A new set of rules enacted in 2005 prohibited asset diversion for “non-operational” purposes. Firms complying with these rules have experienced a reduction in related party transactions, an increase in investment, and better performance. In contrast, another set of contemporary rules, which aimed to standardize the practice of firms providing loan guarantees, has had very little impact. We attribute the contrasting design, implementation, and effectiveness of these two sets of rules to the difference in enforcement costs of the two types of tunneling activities. Relative to loan guarantees, it is much easier for a third party to determine (ex ante) whether a particular form of diversion destroys firm value, and to verify (ex post) that the losses to the firm resulted from the diversion. Our results highlight the importance of enforceability—laws and regulations that can be enforced at lower costs are more likely to succeed, especially in countries with underdeveloped formal institutions.

Domestically listed Chinese (A‐share) firms have lower stock returns than externally listed Chinese, developed, and emerging country firms during 2000 to 2018. They also have lower net cash flows than matched unlisted Chinese firms. The underperformance of both stock and accounting returns is more pronounced for large A‐share firms, while small firms show no underperformance along either dimension. Investor sentiment explains low stock returns in the cross‐country and within‐A‐share samples. Institutional deficiencies in listing and delisting processes and weak corporate governance in terms of shareholder value creation are consistent with the underperformance in stock returns and net cash flows.