This paper estimates consumption and GDP tail risk dynamics over the long run (1900–2020). Our predictive approach circumvents the scarcity of large macroeconomic crises by exploiting a rich information set covering 42 countries. This flexible approach does not require asset price information and can thus serve as a benchmark to evaluate the empirical validity of rare disaster models. Our estimates covary with asset prices and forecast future stock returns, in line with theory. A calibration disciplined by our estimates supports the prediction that macroeconomic tail risk drives the equity premium.

We use a present-value model of the real exchange rate to impose structure on the currency risk premium. We allow the currency risk premium to depend on both the interest rate differential and a latent component: the missing risk premium. Consistent with the data, our present-value model implies that the real exchange rate should predict currency returns. We find that the missing risk premium, not the interest rate differential, explains most of the variation in the real exchange rate. Moreover, our model sheds light on puzzling relations between the interest rate differential, the real exchange rate, and the currency risk premium.

An artist’s death constitutes a negative shock to his future production; death permanently decreases the artist’s float. We use this shock to test predictions of speculative trading models with short-selling constraints. As predicted in our model, we find that an artist’s premature death leads to a permanent increase in prices and turnover; this effect being larger for more famous artists. We document that premature death increases prices (by 54.7%) and secondary market volume (by 63.2%).

We study the mechanisms driving bank losses across historical banking crises in 46 economies and the effectiveness of policy interventions in restoring bank capitalization. We find that bank stocks experience large, permanent declines at the onset of crises. These losses predict commensurate long-term declines in banks’ earnings and dividends, rather than elevated future equity returns. Bank losses are primarily driven by write-downs of nonperforming assets, not asset sales during panics. Forceful liquidity-based interventions during crises predict only small, temporary increases in bank market value. Overall, these results suggest that bank losses during crises are not primarily due to temporary price dislocations. Early liquidity interventions can avert banking crises, but only under specific conditions. Once large bank equity declines have occurred, policy responses have historically failed to prevent persistent undercapitalization in the banking sector.