This paper studies how high uncertainty affects corporate bank loans, addressing the important issue of identification. In times of high uncertainty, firms reduce their credit demand due to delayed investments or a deterioration in credit worthiness. Simultaneously, banks are more exposed to negative shocks to their balance sheet, reducing credit supply. To isolate the uncertainty effect from the credit supply effect, we employ matched bank-firm loan data covering all loans extended by all financial intermediaries to listed firms in Korea, a bank-centered economy. Our empirical results reveal that a failure to control for credit supply leads to overestimating the effect of uncertainty on bank loans. In terms of the transmission channel of uncertainty, we find the evidence of both the real option channel and the financial channel: the negative effect is stronger for firms with a higher degree of investment irreversibility and financially constrained firms. In addition, our findings suggest that larger firms may be predominantly affected by uncertainty shocks through the real option channel rather than the financial channel. In addition, our empirical findings on firm investments align with those on bank loans.

I examine how investors’ search for different types of information affects managers’ reporting decisions. I distinguish investors’ search for information about firm fundamentals (“fundamental search”) from their search for information about managers’ incentives (“incentive search”). Based on a parsimonious model of misreporting, I predict that fundamental search reduces the earnings response coefficient, which reduces managers’ benefits from misreporting, resulting in less misreporting. In contrast, incentive search increases the earnings response coefficient, which increases the benefits from misreporting, resulting in more misreporting. I test these predictions using an empirical technique that classifies EDGAR downloads as fundamental search or incentive search. Consistent with my theoretical predictions, I find that fundamental (incentive) search is negatively (positively) related to the earnings response coefficients and intentional restatements. I confirm my findings in two distinct empirical settings where the costs of information search exogenously changed: the adoption of XBRL and the electronic filing mandate of Form 4s. Collectively, the results show that investors’ information demand can shape managers’ reporting decisions, and its effects can vary depending on the type of information investors search for.

Classical models of voluntary disclosure feature two economic forces: the existence of an adverse selection problem (e.g., a manager possesses some private information) and the cost of ameliorating the problem (e.g., costs associated with disclosure). Traditionally these forces are modelled independently. In this paper, we use a simple model to motivate empirical predictions in a setting where these forces are jointly determined––where greater adverse selection entails greater costs of disclosure. We show that joint determination of these forces generates a pronounced non-linearity in the probability of voluntary disclosure. We find that this non-linearity is empirically descriptive of multiple measures of voluntary disclosure in two distinct empirical settings that are commonly thought to feature both private information and proprietary costs: capital investments and sales to major customers.