Using investor-level data, I document that the disposition effect is absent following a stock split; inattentive investors may fail to split-adjust their reference point, confusing the winner versus loser status of their holdings. Consistent with the disposition effect impeding the incorporation of news, ex-date returns are significantly higher for split stocks with higher gains. However, the magnitude is small relative to momentum, and momentum remains robustly present among this sample of stocks void of the disposition effect. The results suggest that the disposition effect may slow the incorporation of news, but not to the extent that it alone explains momentum.

Long-short anomaly returns are strongly related to the day of the week. Anomalies for which the speculative leg is the short (long) leg experience the highest (lowest) returns on Monday. The opposite pattern is observed on Friday. The effects are large. Monday (Friday) alone accounts for over 100% of returns for all anomalies examined for which the short (long) leg is the speculative leg. Consistent with a mispricing explanation, the pattern is driven by the speculative leg. The observed patterns are consistent with the abundance of evidence in the psychology literature that mood increases on Friday and decreases on Monday.

Using investor-level data, I document that the disposition effect is absent following a stock split; inattentive investors may fail to split-adjust their reference point, confusing the winner versus loser status of their holdings. Consistent with the disposition effect impeding the incorporation of news, ex-date returns are significantly higher for split stocks with higher gains. However, the magnitude is small relative to momentum, and momentum remains robustly present among this sample of stocks void of the disposition effect. The results suggest that the disposition effect may slow the incorporation of news, but not to the extent that it alone explains momentum.

Sentiment should exhibit its strongest effects on asset prices at times when valuations are most subjective. Accordingly, we show that a one-standard-deviation increase in aggregate uncertainty amplifies the predictive ability of sentiment for market returns by two to four times relative to when uncertainty is at its mean. For the cross-section of returns, the predictive ability of sentiment for assets expected to be most sensitive to sentiment, including existing measures of both risk and mispricing, is substantially larger in times of higher uncertainty. The results hold for both daily and monthly proxies for sentiment and for various proxies for uncertainty.

We document evidence consistent with retail traders in the Forex market attributing random success to their own skill and, as a consequence, increasing risk taking. Although past performance does not predict future success for these traders, traders increase trade sizes, trade size variability, and number of trades with gains, and less with losses. There is a large discontinuity in all of these trading variables around zero past week returns: e.g., traders increase their trade size dramatically following winning weeks, relative to losing weeks. The effects are stronger for novice traders, consistent with more intense “learning” in early trading periods.

We argue that the effective price of investing in hedge funds far exceeds the headline fee rate of “2-and-20.” In a large 22-year sample of hedge funds, we find that 60% of the gains on which incentive fees are paid are eventually offset by losses. As a result, the effective incentive fee rate is 50% vis-à-vis the nominal 20% rate. The tendency of investors and managers to disinvest capital after negative returns contributes to this phenomenon by causing the crystallization of underwater fees and net losses as well as by eroding the protection intended by the high-water mark provision. (JEL D24, G11, G23, J33)Received: April 17, 2025Editor: J.

We explore the psychology of stock price levels and provide evidence that investors suffer from a nominal price illusion in which they overestimate the room to grow for low-priced stocks relative to high-priced stocks. While it has become increasingly clear that nominal price levels influence investor behavior, why prices matter to investors is a question that as of yet has gone unanswered. We find widespread evidence that investors systematically overestimate the skewness of low-priced stocks. In the broad cross-section of stocks, we find that investors substantially overweight the importance of price when forming skewness expectations. Asset pricing implications of our findings are borne out in the options market. A zero-cost option portfolio strategy that exploits investor overestimation of skewness for low-priced stocks generates significant abnormal returns. Finally, investor expectations of future skewness increase drastically on days that a stock undergoes a split to a lower nominal price. Empirically, however, future physical skewness decreases following splits.

We study whether industry familiarity is an advantage in stock trading by exploring the trading patterns of industry insiders in their own personal portfolios. To do so, we identify accounts of industry insiders in a large data set provided by a retail discount broker. We find that insiders trade firms from their own industry more frequently. Furthermore, they earn abnormal returns exclusively when trading own-industry stocks, especially obscure stocks (small, low analyst coverage, high volatility). In a battery of tests, we find no evidence of the use of private information. The results are most consistent with the interpretation that industry familiarity is an advantage in stock trading.

Sell-side quantitative equity research analysts (Quants) conduct econometric analyses of stock returns to uncover market anomalies and assist equity analysts and institutional clients with stock selection. We present novel evidence that establishes their role in helping analysts and mutual fund clients discover market anomalies and capital markets evolve toward greater pricing efficiency. Specifically, we find that analysts and mutual fund clients with greater access to Quants make recommendations and trades that reveal greater knowledge of anomalous cross-sectional return predictability. More importantly, cross-sectional return predictability is weaker in stocks that have higher coverage (ownership) by analysts (mutual fund clients) with access to Quants, and strengthens when quasi-exogenous brokerage house closures reduce the availability of Quants.