A number of studies of U.S. stock returns document what is referred to as the investment or asset growth effect. Specifically, firms that increase investment or total assets subsequently earn lower risk-adjusted returns. This study finds substantial cross-country differences in the asset growth effect. In particular, the asset growth effect is stronger in countries with more developed financial markets, but it does not seem to be associated with corporate governance or the costs of trading. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a q-theory where financial market development captures either managers’ willingness or ability to align investment expenditures to the cost of capital, but it is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the asset growth effect is due to bad governance and overinvestment.

We test the implications of anchoring bias associated with forecast earnings per share (FEPS) for forecast errors, earnings surprises, stock returns, and stock splits. We find that analysts make optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts when a firm’s FEPS is lower (higher) than the industry median. Further, firms with FEPS greater (lower) than the industry median experience abnormally high (low) future stock returns, particularly around subsequent earnings announcement dates. These firms are also more likely to engage in stock splits. Finally, split firms experience more positive forecast revisions, more negative forecast errors, and more negative earnings surprises after stock splits.

Executive pay disparity, as measured by chief executive officer (CEO) pay slice (CPS), is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, even after controlling for other determinants of the cost of equity. The difference in the cost of equity can explain 43% of the difference in the valuation effect attributable to CPS reported by Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). Further analysis shows that the positive association is stronger when agency problems of free cash flow are more severe and when CEO succession planning is more important. Our evidence suggests that a large CPS is associated with CEO entrenchment and high succession risk.