We study the underpricing and long-term performance of A- and B-share initial public offerings (IPOs) issued in China during the 1993–1998 period. The average underpricing for A- and B share IPOs are 178% and 11.6%, respectively. The underpricing of A-share IPOs is positively related to the number of days between the offering and the listing and the number of stock investors in the province from which the IPO comes, and negatively related to the number of shares being issued. None of these characteristics explain the underpricing of B-share IPOs. In the long run, A-share IPOs slightly underperform the size- and/or book/market (B/M)-matched portfolios while B-shares outperform the benchmark portfolios.

Firms that substantially increase capital investments subsequently achieve negative benchmark-adjusted returns. The negative abnormal capital investment/return relation is shown to be stronger for firms that have greater investment discretion, i.e., firms with higher cash flows and lower debt ratios, and is shown to be significant only in time periods when hostile takeovers were less prevalent. These observations are consistent with the hypothesis that investors tend to underreact to the empire building implications of increased investment expenditures. Although firms that increase capital investments tend to have high past returns and often issue equity, the negative abnormal capital investment/return relation is independent of the previously documented long-term return reversal and secondary equity issue anomalies.