The factors that drive cross‐sectional differences in expected stock returns in emerging equity markets are qualitatively similar to those that have been documented for developed markets. Emerging market stocks exhibit momentum, small stocks outperform large stocks, and value stocks outperform growth stocks. There is no evidence that high beta stocks outperform low beta stocks. A Bayesian analysis of the return premiums shows that the combined evidence of developed and emerging markets strongly favors the hypothesis that similar return factors are present in markets around the world. Finally, there exists a strong cross‐sectional correlation between the return factors and share turnover.

International equity markets exhibit medium-term return continuation. Between 1980 and 1995 an internationally diversified portfolio of past medium-term Winners outperforms a portfolio of medium-term Losers after correcting for risk by more than 1 percent per month. Return continuation is present in all twelve sample countries and lasts on average for about one year. Return continuation is negatively related to firm size, but is not limited to small firms. The international momentum returns are correlated with those of the United States which suggests that exposure to a common factor may drive the profitability of momentum strategies.

We test a Wall Street investment strategy, "pairs trading," with daily data over 1962-2002. Stocks are matched into pairs with minimum distance between normalized historical prices. A simple trading rule yields average annualized excess returns of up to 11% for self-financing portfolios of pairs. The profits typically exceed conservative transaction-cost estimates. Bootstrap results suggest that the "pairs" effect differs from previously documented reversal profits. Robustness of the excess returns indicates that pairs trading profits from temporary mispricing of close substitutes. We link the profitability to the presence of a common factor in the returns, different from conventional risk measures.

The factors that drive cross‐sectional differences in expected stock returns in emerging equity markets are qualitatively similar to those that have been documented for developed markets. Emerging market stocks exhibit momentum, small stocks outperform large stocks, and value stocks outperform growth stocks. There is no evidence that high beta stocks outperform low beta stocks. A Bayesian analysis of the return premiums shows that the combined evidence of developed and emerging markets strongly favors the hypothesis that similar return factors are present in markets around the world. Finally, there exists a strong cross‐sectional correlation between the return factors and share turnover.

International equity markets exhibit medium‐term return continuation. Between 1980 and 1995 an internationally diversified portfolio of past medium‐term Winners outperforms a portfolio of medium‐term Losers after correcting for risk by more than 1 percent per month. Return continuation is present in all twelve sample countries and lasts on average for about one year. Return continuation is negatively related to firm size, but is not limited to small firms. The international momentum returns are correlated with those of the United States which suggests that exposure to a common factor may drive the profitability of momentum strategies.

William N. Goetzmann, , K. Geert Rouwenhorst, Day Trading International Mutual Funds: Evidence and Policy Solutions, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 287-309

Investors face significant barriers in evaluating the performance of hedge funds and commodity trading advisors (CTAs). The only available performance data comes from voluntary reporting to private companies. Funds have incentives to strategically report to these companies, causing these data sets to be severely biased. And, because hedge funds use nonlinear, state-dependent, leveraged strategies, it has proven difficult to determine whether they add value relative to benchmarks. We focus on commodity trading advisors, a subset of hedge funds, and show that during the period 1994-2007 CTA excess returns to investors (i.e., net of fees) averaged 85 basis points per annum over US T-bills, which is insignificantly different from zero. We estimate that CTAs on average earned gross excess returns (i.e., before fees) of 5.4%, which implies that funds captured most of their performance through charging fees. Yet, even before fees we find that CTAs display no alpha relative to simple futures strategies that are in the public domain. We argue that CTAs appear to persist as an asset class despite their poor performance, because they face no market discipline based on credible information. Our evidence suggests that investors' experience of poor performance is not common knowledge.

We test a Wall Street investment strategy, “pairs trading,” with daily data over 1962–2002. Stocks are matched into pairs with minimum distance between normalized historical prices. A simple trading rule yields average annualized excess returns of up to 11% for self-financing portfolios of pairs. The profits typically exceed conservative transaction-cost estimates. Bootstrap results suggest that the “pairs” effect differs from previously documented reversal profits. Robustness of the excess returns indicates that pairs trading profits from temporary mispricing of close substitutes. We link the profitability to the presence of a common factor in the returns, different from conventional risk measures.

Commodity futures risk premiums vary across commodities and over time depending on the level of physical inventories. The convenience yield is a decreasing, nonlinear function of inventories. Price measures, such as the futures basis, prior futures returns, prior spot returns, and spot price volatilities reflect the state of inventories and are informative about commodity futures risk premiums. We verify these theoretical predictions using a comprehensive data set on 31 commodity futures and physical inventories between 1971 and 2010. We find no evidence that the positions of participants in futures markets predict risk premiums on commodity futures.

The Mississippi Bubble, South Sea Bubble and the Dutch Windhandel of 1720 together represent the world's first global financial bubble. We hand-collect cross-sectional price data and investor account data from 1720 to test theories about market bubbles. Our tests suggest that innovation was a key driver of bubble expectations. We present evidence against the currently prevailing debt-for-equity conversion hypothesis and relate stock returns to innovations in Atlantic trade and insurance. We find evidence consistent with the innovation-driven bubble dynamics documented by Pastor and Veronesi (2009) for new economy stocks. Our evidence seems inconsistent with clientele-based theories that emphasize bubble-riding and short-sales restrictions.