[A versatile computer model for audit-staff scheduling based on a zero-one integer program was presented by Balachandran and Zoltners [1981] (BZ). This paper extends the work of BZ by demonstrating how precedence constraints, due dates, penalty costs, resource leveling, and other audit considerations can be added to the zero-one integer program for audit scheduling. These additional features help improve the realism of the scheduling model, thus making the model more practical for applications.]

This research studies how Chinese tax authorities implement international transfer pricing legislation. The analysis indicates that tax audits on transfer pricing are confined mainly to medium- and small-sized foreign investments, lower-technology companies and transfer of tangible goods, and tend to focus on certain nationality and forms of foreign investment. Persistent losses, low profitability and lack of local partners in joint venture management most often trigger tax audits. The authorities focus on profit results rather than prices, and often use comparable profit method to adjust income. Tax differentials do not appear to be the most important inducement to transfer pricing manipulations.

2008 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting in Anaheim, the 2009 Contemporary Accounting Research/Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Special Joint Symposium, and workshops at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics for their helpful comments

Abstract ABSTRACT: A versatile computer model for audit-staff scheduling based on a zero-one integer program was presented by Balachandran and Zoltners [1981] (BZ). This paper extends the work of BZ by demonstrating how precedence constraints, due dates, penalty costs, resource leveling, and other audit considerations can be added to the zero-one integer program for audit scheduling. These additional features help improve the realism of the scheduling model, thus making the model more practical for applications.

Many developing economies use tax holidays to attract foreign investment by providing a limited period of tax exemptions and reductions for qualified investors. This paper investigates the effect of tax holidays on foreign investors' tax noncompliance behavior in China's developing economy. We measure noncompliance in terms of tax audit adjustments the Chinese tax authorities require in response to avoidance and evasion. The results indicate that a company's tax-holiday position affects noncompliance. Companies are least compliant before entering a tax holiday, and most compliant while in a tax-exemption period. In addition, domestic market-oriented companies, service-oriented companies, and joint ventures are less compliant than export-oriented companies, manufacturing-oriented companies, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises, respectively. Our evidence is relevant to policymakers designing tax incentives to attract foreign investors. Our evidence on noncompliance should also help tax authorities and field auditors plan more effective and efficient tax audits. In addition, the results should provide researchers an interesting perspective to study the effect of tax-rate incentives on corporate tax noncompliance.

This paper deals with the theoretical development of some aspects of the trend removal problem. The objective is to show the difference between the two most popular trend removal methods: first differences and linear least squares regression. On the one hand, we show that if first differences are used to eliminate a linear trend, the series of residuals would be stationary but would not be white noises as they contain a first lag autocorrelation of -0.50. Furthermore, the spectral density function (SDF) of these residuals relative to that of a white noise series would be exaggerated at the high frequency portion and attenuated at the low frequency portion. On the other hand, we show that the regression residuals from the linear detrending of a random walk series would contain large positive autocorrelations in the first few lags. Relative to that of white noises, the SDF of the regression residuals would be exaggerated at the low frequency portion and attenuated at the high frequency portion.

We investigate whether a departure from a tax-based accounting system toward the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards encourages tax noncompliance. We also examine whether such a departure, which weakens book-tax conformity, affects the informativeness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance. Our evidence suggests that as book-tax conformity decreases, tax noncompliance increases. Although book-tax differences remain informative of tax noncompliance, the informativeness attenuates as book-tax conformity weakens. Additionally, firms with high incentives to inflate book income are more tax compliant than their counterparts after the departure from a tax-based accounting system.

ABSTRACT Local governments play dual, but conflicting, roles in China's tax system. That is, they are both tax collectors and controlling shareholders of firms subject to tax payments. We investigate how local governments balance their tax collection and tax avoidance incentives. We find that the conflicts between central and local governments arising from the 2002 tax sharing reform have led to more tax avoidance by local government-controlled firms, particularly when the local government's ownership percentage of the firms is higher than the tax sharing ratio. We also find evidence that the overall level of tax avoidance by local government-controlled firms in a region is positively associated with local fiscal deficits. As a high level of government ownership of corporations and intergovernmental tax sharing are common phenomena in many transitional economies, this study offers valuable insights into how the dual roles played by local governments affect tax policy enforcement in these economies. JEL Classifications: H26; H71; M40; G38.