In this paper, we examine how the exclusion of voluntary and mandatory accounting changes from the calculation of covenant compliance affects the interest rate charged on the loan. After controlling for self-selection bias and other factors known to affect loan spreads, we find that the rate charged is 84 basis points lower when voluntary accounting changes are excluded and 71 basis points lower when mandatory accounting changes are excluded. Our results suggest that borrowers are willing to pay substantially higher interest rates to retain accounting flexibility that may help them avoid covenant violations and to avoid duplicate record-keeping costs.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the relationship between the level of short interest and stock returns in the Nasdaq market from June 1988 through December 1994. We find that heavily shorted firms experience significant negative abnormal returns ranging from −0.76 to −1.13 percent per month after controlling for the market, size, book‐to‐market, and momentum factors. These negative returns increase with the level of short interest, indicating that a higher level of short interest is a stronger bearish signal. We find that heavily shorted firms are more likely to be delisted compared to their size, book‐to‐market, and momentum matched control firms.