This study examines whether personal liability for corporate malfeasance deters individuals from serving as independent directors. After the introduction of personal liability in India, we find that individuals are deterred from serving on corporate boards. We find stronger deterrence among firms with greater litigation and regulatory risk, higher monitoring costs, and weak monetary incentives. Expert directors are more likely to exit, resulting in 1.16% lower firm value. We further evaluate whether contemporaneous corporate governance reforms and market developments contribute to this deterrence. Overall, our results suggest that personal liability deters individuals with high reputational costs from serving as independent directors.

Exploiting the unique institutional setting of Hong Kong’s real estate market, we uncover a curious ripple effect of haunted houses on the prices of nearby houses. Prices drop on average 20% for units that become haunted, 10% for units on the same floor, 7% for units in the same block, and 1% for units in the same estate. Our study makes two contributions. First, we provide an estimate of a large negative spillover on prices caused by a quality shock. Second, we find that the demand shock rather than the fire sale supply shock explains most of the spillover.