[Managers frequently encounter situations involving a trade-off between financial reporting and tax reporting incentives. This paper examines whether inside ownership concentration, a proxy for reduced capital market pressure, influences the balance of these two opposing external reporting incentives. The empirical tests use a sample of major asset divestitures to show that, for high tax-rate firms, managers of firms with lower levels of inside ownership concentration realize larger gains or smaller losses, on average. This work extends previous research by combining insights from the micro-economics tax incentives literature and financial reporting incentives literature, and by considering explicitly the effect of a firm-specific variable on the balance between these two incentives.]

Managers frequently encounter situations involving a trade-off between financial reporting and tax reporting incentives. This paper examines whether inside ownership concentration, a proxy for reduced capital market pressure, influences the balance of these two opposing external reporting incentives. The empirical tests use a sample of major asset divestitures to show that, for high tax- rate firms, managers of firms with lower levels of inside ownership concentration realize larger gains or smaller losses, on average. This work extends previous research by combining insights from the micro-economics tax incentives literature and financial reporting incentives literature, and by considering explicitly the effect of a firm-specific variable on the balance between these two incentives.

ABSTRACT This study examines the interplay between tax and internal reporting incentives among affiliates of multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs face limited information flows that may prevent affiliates' performance metrics to be responsive immediately to changes in the firm's tax planning. Using granular data of affiliates belonging to MNCs from 21 European countries, our study provides new empirical evidence of affiliate internal reporting responses induced by changing tax plans. When high‐tax‐rate countries tighten income shifting rules, we first document that income shifting is reduced and low‐tax‐rate affiliates have less income. Second, we predict and document that managers of these low‐tax‐rate affiliates offset this decrease in profits by managing upwards a key performance metric: affiliate earnings. Our results are consistent with firms not quickly adjusting the affiliate managers' incentives in the face of changing tax planning strategies, and affiliates managing reported earnings to offset the effect of changes in the tax planning of the firm. Cross‐sectional analyses provide further evidence consistent with the theory underlying the main tests. The results support the policy of tightening income shifting rules when the objective is to reduce income shifting, and firms' central management would benefit from considering the implications of changing tax plans on the assessment of local managers.

We empirically document a strategy through which corporations avoid state income taxes. Examining aggregated American state and Canadian provincial data from 1983–1991, we find corporate income tax revenues are concave in corporate tax rates, consistent with firms shifting their tax bases to more favourably taxed jurisdictions. Additional tests exploit unique features of state formula apportionment systems and find manufacturing shipments from states that tax outside their borders (throwback states) are decreasing in corporate income tax rates on sales.

ABSTRACT This study investigates how transfer pricing risk affects the premiums in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Differences in the rigor of transfer pricing enforcement and the severity and clarity of rules across countries create differential risk of material costs for multinationals as they expand globally. We use 448 country‐level transfer pricing risk assessments by global transfer pricing partners and managers from two firms in 33 countries to develop a metric of country‐year transfer pricing risks. The resulting measure of transfer pricing risk is used to analyze the premiums of 3,103 cross‐border M&A from 2000 to 2012. We find that lower bid premiums are associated with higher transfer pricing risk in the target's country. We find the relation is stronger when expected future transfer pricing benefits are larger. Our results, consistent with the views of experts in the field, provide the first archival evidence that acquirers consider synergies created by future tax planning when estimating the value of a target.

This study explores the effects of financial and tax reporting incentives on options granted to chief executive officers in Canada. Extant studies with a similar objective (Yermack 1995; Matsunaga 1995) explore predominantly nonqualified U.S. option grants that are deductible to the extent that the options are in the money at the time of exercise. In contrast, Canadian firms do not get a tax deduction for their stock option grants at any time. In both countries, no expense is recorded for financial reporting purposes. As a result, the financial reporting and tax reporting trade‐off is more pronounced in the Canadian setting of this study compared with the U.S. setting. We measure option granting behavior as the ratio of the Black‐Scholes value of stock option grants to the sum of cash compensation and the value of stock option grants. Using a sample of 806 firm‐year observations during the period 1993‐95, we find that observed option grants are significantly correlated with proxies for short‐run financial reporting incentives. We also find evidence that option granting behavior is correlated with proxies for tax incentives.

ABSTRACT This paper examines income shifting of U.S. multinational companies over the past two decades. Domestic and foreign policy makers are increasingly concerned with the effect of income shifting on dwindling tax revenues, however, extant research on income shifting by U.S. multinational enterprises is mixed. We address the disconnect between the academic literature and the policy maker's perceptions by examining the extent of multijurisdictional income shifting by U.S. multinational companies. We directly address conflicting results in extant literature and show that using either multiperiod proxies or instrumental variables overcomes weaknesses of annual proxies in this setting. Our tests show that U.S. companies have become more active at shifting income out of the United States as the regulatory costs of shifting have changed. Holding tax rate differences between U.S. and foreign jurisdictions constant, our empirical estimates suggest that our sample of 380 corporations with low average foreign tax rates collectively shifts approximately $10 billion of additional income out of the United States annually during 2005–2009 relative to 1998–2002 due to varying regulatory costs of shifting.

We investigate whether international income-shifting aggressiveness affects local investments. Amid heightened scrutiny of international activities by tax authorities, firms can support income-shifting goals by locating investments consistent with reported income. As a consequence, we predict firms that aggressively shift income will make affiliate-level investment decisions less influenced by local investment opportunities than firms that do not aggressively shift income. We use affiliate-level data from multinational corporations to develop a firm-year proxy for the sensitivity of reported income to cross-border tax incentives. Results suggest firm-years with below-median income-shifting aggressiveness exhibit a typical responsiveness of local investments to investment opportunities, but firm-years with above-median income-shifting aggressiveness exhibit no statistical relation. Consistent with expectations, these results are stronger for firms with better governance or subject to greater tax authority scrutiny. Our tests extend the literature on investment distortions by documenting that multinational corporations’ international tax considerations alter their local tangible investment decisions.