Caste plays a role at every stage of an Indian's economic life, in school, university, the labor market, and into old age. The influence of caste extends beyond private economic activity into the public sphere, where caste politics determines access to public resources. The aggregate evidence indicates that there has been convergence in education, occupations, income, and access to public resources across caste groups in the decades after independence. Some of this convergence is likely due to affirmative action, but caste-based networks could also have played an equalizing role by exploiting the opportunities that became available in a globalizing economy. Ethnic networks were once active in many advanced economies but ceased to be salient once markets developed. With economic development, it is possible that caste networks will cease to be salient in India. The affirmative action programs may also be rolled back and (statistical) discrimination in urban labor markets may come to an end if and when there is convergence across caste groups. In the interim period, however, it is important to understand the positive and negative consequences of caste involvement across a variety of spheres in the Indian economy.

The “new classical” theory states that families in low-skill occupations with low levels of human capital can stay poor from one generation to the next, while families in high-skill occupations with correspondingly high levels of human capital stay wealthy, despite being endowed with the same level of ability on average. This paper proposes an informal institutional mechanism—the community-based network—through which families belonging to the same neighbourhood or kinship group can bootstrap their way out of such low-skill occupational traps. The insight from the dynamic model that is developed is that once they form, new networks providing mutual support to their members and substituting for inherited parental human capital and wealth will strengthen most rapidly in historically disadvantaged communities, generating a correspondingly high level of intergenerational mobility. These predictions are successfully tested using unique data from India. The analysis in this paper, coupled with an emerging empirical literature on networks and migration, provides a new perspective on mobility in developing countries, with restrictive traditional networks decaying even as new networks supporting collective mobility form and strengthen over time.

This paper studies the effect of community identity on investment behaviour in the knitted garment industry in the South Indian town of Tirupur. We document very large and systematic differences in both levels of capital stock and the capital intensity of production in firms owned by people from two different community groups. We argue that the differences in investment cannot be explained by productivity differences alone. We suggest that the most likely explanation is that the two communities differ in their access to capital.

This paper explores new roles that traditionally rural kinship networks organized around the marriage institution might play in improving labor market outcomes in urban Africa. Using new data from Kisumu, Kenya, and controlling for selection into marriage, we find that marriage significantly increases employment levels and incomes in our sample of migrants. At the same time, marriage increases the remittances that migrants send to the extended family, consistent with the view that the benefits of the network come with additional social obligations. These obligations appear to be borne disproportionately by high-ability individuals, who consequently defer marriage. The negative selection into marriage that we uncover has consequences for the future viability of the urban networks, with implications for long-term growth and distribution in this economy.

We provide an explanation for the large spatial wage disparities and low male migration in India based on the trade-off between consumption smoothing, provided by caste-based rural insurance networks, and the income gains from migration. Our theory generates two key empirically verified predictions: (i) males in relatively wealthy households within a caste who benefit less from the redistributive (surplus-maximizing) network will be more likely to migrate, and (ii) males in households facing greater rural income risk (who benefit more from the insurance network) migrate less. Structural estimates show that small improvements in formal insurance decrease the spatial misallocation of labor by substantially increasing migration.

This paper addresses the question of how traditional institutions interact with the forces of globalization to shape the economic mobility and welfare of particular groups of individuals in the new economy. We explore the role of one such traditional institution—the caste system—in shaping career choices by gender in Bombay using new survey data on school enrollment and income over the past 20 years. We find that male working-class—lower-caste—networks continue to channel boys into local language schools that lead to the traditional occupation, despite the fact that returns to nontraditional white-collar occupations rose substantially in the 1990s, suggesting the possibility of a dynamic inefficiency. In contrast, lower-caste girls, who historically had low labor market participation rates and so did not benefit from the network, are taking full advantage of the opportunities that became available in the new economy by switching rapidly to English schools.

This paper presents a theory of rent seeking within farmer cooperatives in which inequality of asset ownership affects relative control rights of different groups of members. The two key assumptions are constraints on lump‐sum transfers from poorer members and disproportionate control rights wielded by wealthier members. Transfers of rents to the latter are achieved by depressing prices paid for inputs supplied by members and diverting resulting retained earnings. The theory predicts that increased heterogeneity of landholdings in the local area causes increased inefficiency by inducing a lower input price and a lower level of installed crushing capacity. Predictions concerning the effect of the distribution of local landownership on sugarcane price, capacity levels, and participation rates of different classes of farmers are confirmed by data from nearly 100 sugar cooperatives in the Indian state of Maharashtra over the period 1971–93.