We advance social identity theory in the context of corporate governance research by evaluating how experiences outside the audit committee (AC) relate to AC members’ (ACMs’) professional identities and how these identities then map into ACMs’ responsibilities, how ACMs perceive that they add value, and how ACMs aid in the resolution of difficult judgments and decisions. We identify and evaluate four non-exclusive ACM social identities: executive management, financial management, investment management, and audit partner. We find that prior experiences relate to the social identities with which ACMs identify, yet identities also develop without role-relevant experiences. Interpreting the interviews leads us to propose a novel theory – mediational activism – a hybrid perspective whereby the ACM acts in multiple seemingly incongruent modes as a monitor, collaborator, and/or advocate with the intent to organize collective understanding, action, and mutually equitable outcomes. We find that ACMs’ perceptions of their primary role-relevant responsibilities are consistent with agency theory and extensive mediational activism, while perceptions of value-add are more consistent with the theory of resource dependence and reflect the desire to leverage prior experiences. Finally, we provide evidence on a host of difficult judgments and decisions that ACMs oversee, and find that they sometimes use typical negotiation strategies such as contending and compromising, but rarely resort to offering concessions. Employing these strategies differs based on social identities, but regardless of their identities ACMs most commonly approach their oversight role in resolving difficult judgments and decisions by adopting a mediational activism perspective.

This study uses experimental economic markets to investigate the impact of risk and the potential for loss on managers' demand for audit quality. We posit that these two important contextual factors influence managers' audit quality preferences. We study these factors because they are ubiquitous to companies, and we focus on their influence on managers because managers continue to play a significant role in the auditor hiring process and we know relatively little about their auditor preferences. We predict that risk, the potential for loss, and their interaction will each decrease manager demand for high audit quality due to a desire to achieve greater reporting flexibility. Experimental results are consistent with our predictions; specifically, increased risk, the potential for loss, and to a lesser extent their interaction, significantly reduce managers' likelihood of hiring the best available auditor in the market. Path analysis indicates that this reduction in audit quality demand leads to increases in misreporting. Finally, we observe investors overpaying for assets to a greater extent when managers hire lower‐quality auditors. Our results show that the contextual factors of risk and the potential for loss, which are ubiquitous to companies, can reduce demand for audit quality, which can increase misreporting behavior and ultimately harm investors.