We investigated the benefits (more accurate valuations) obtained from the use of more specific measures, such as the use of specific price indexes, rather than a general price index, to approximate the current value of historical cost accounting numbers. We found the valuation accuracy function for the Canadian economy to be highly convex; that is, marginal gains in accuracy decline sharply as the specificity of price indexes increases. A few broad price indexes yield a relatively accurate valuation of assets, and little accuracy is gained by using more specific price indexes. These results are consistent with empirical studies conducted in the United States (Hall 1982; Sunder and Way mire 1983; Shriver 1986) and Australia (Tippett 1987). These results suggest that Canadian standard setters may be able to achieve their objective of getting relatively accurate valuations for industrial assets by adopting a simple and verifiable price index methodology, rather than resorting to costly and complicated computations such as those required by Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) Handbook Section 4510. Résumé. Les auteurs étudient les avantages (évaluations plus exactes) de l'utilisation plus grande de mesures spécifiques — comme celles d'indices des prix spécifiques plutôt que d'un indice des prix général — pour obtenir la valeur actuelle approximative des données produites par la comptabilité au coût d'origine. Ils constatent que la fonction d'exactitude de l'évaluation pour l'économie canadienne présente une grande convexité, c'est‐à‐dire que les gains marginaux en exactitude déclinent abruptement lorsque la spécificité des indices de prix augmente. Quelques grands indices des prix livrent une évaluation relativement exacte de l'actif, et l'on gagne peu d'exactitude en utilisant des indices des prix plus spécifiques. Ces résultats sont conformes aux études empiriques réalisées aux États‐Unis (Hall, 1982; Sunder et Waymire, 1983; Shriver, 1986) et en Australie (Tippett, 1987). Les résultats portent à croire que les responsables canadiens de la normalisation pourraient être en mesure d'atteindre leur objectif d'évaluations relativement exactes, dans le cas des actifs industriels, en adoptant une méthodologie d'indice des prix simple et verifiable plutôt que de recourir à des calculs onéreux et complexes comme ceux qu'exige le chapitre 4510 du Manuel de l'I.C.C.A.

An implicit assumption of prior literature on strategic behavior of auditors is that auditors know the preferences of their colleagues. In this study, we conduct an experiment to investigate the validity of this assumption. In our experiment, we match a manager with a pair of top and mediocre audit seniors, as assessed by their firm. Each auditor predicts the choices that will be made by other auditors on two tasks that differ in their level of ambiguity. Our results show no difference in the accuracy among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors when they predict the choices made by specific individual auditors for both tasks. When predicting the number of managers and seniors who will choose a specific option on the high‐ambiguity task, managers outperform top seniors, who in turn outperform mediocre seniors. For the low‐ambiguity task, we find no difference among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors. Our results provide some limited support for models of strategic auditor behavior, and indicate that the ability to predict the choices of others is a dimension of an auditor’s expertise.

We investigate factors that influence an auditor's accuracy in knowing how subordinates, peers, and superiors view his or her own technical competence (metaperception). Extant literature on reputation management in auditing contexts depicts preparers of audit workpapers as strategic agents (subordinates) who stylize workpapers and engage in behaviors that enhance their reputations with reviewers (superiors). These superiors, in turn, are represented as strategically engaging in coping behaviors in response to such stylization attempts. One of the necessary conditions for auditors to enhance their reputations on a sustainable basis is accurate metaperception. We report the results of an experiment that investigates determinants of auditors' metaperception accuracy. Our participants comprise teams of audit partners, managers, and seniors who work together in the field. Each auditor performs two tasks of varying complexity and then predicts whether other team members can accurately perform the task and how other team members assess his or her performance on the tasks. Results show that accuracy in knowing what others think of one's technical proficiency (metaperception) is generally high, particularly when the predictor auditors are partners and managers; however, metaperception accuracy is asymmetric and varies depending on the predictor auditor, the target auditor being predicted, and task complexity. Implications are discussed.

In this study, we address the question of what kinds of cognitive representations auditors use in a situation of potential financial statement fraud. We divide the problem of detecting fraud into two parts: detecting the frame management has constructed to mask the fraud, and detecting the fraud. We examine two ways proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1986) for detecting a frame: (1) use of multiple representations that provide alternative interpretations of data in the financial statements; and (2) use of a procedure that transforms financial statement data into a standard representation. Twenty‐four audit partners served as participants in the study. Each partner conducted a simulation of a concurring partner review. All auditors reviewed four cases in which management had created a misleading description of the company (a frame) and a financial statement fraud. The results support Kahneman and Tversky's proposal that frames can be detected by transforming a problem into a standard representation. Auditors who used a standard representation successfully detected management's frame, aggregated the items, and detected fraud in all four cases. Auditors who used a standard representation followed a procedure specified by generally accepted auditing standards (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 1988, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1984) for aggregating items. Auditors who used multiple representations detected management's frame on all four cases. These auditors, however, did not use the aggregation procedure specified by auditing standards and failed to detect the fraud on all four cases.

Résumé. Les auteurs s'intéressent ici à la nature des représentations cognitives qu'utilisent les vérificateurs en situation de fraude potentielle dans les états financiers. Ils divisent le problème de détection de la fraude en deux parties: la détection de la mise en scène élaborée par la direction pour masquer la fraude et la détection de la fraude. Ils examinent les deux méthodes de détection des mises en scène proposées par Kahneman et Tversky (1986): 1) l'utilisation de représentations multiples aboutissant à différentes interprétations possibles des données contenues dans les états financiers; et 2) l'utilisation d'une méthode permettant de transposer les données contenues dans les états financiers sous forme de représentation normalisée. Vingt‐quatre associés de vérification ont participé à l'étude. Chacun d'eux devait procéder à la contre‐révision d'un dossier de vérification. Tous les vérificateurs examinaient quatre cas dans lesquels la direction avait présenté une image trompeuse de l'entreprise (au moyen d'une mise en scène) et produit des états financiers frauduleux. Les résultats obtenus par les auteurs confirment la thèse de Kahneman et Tversky selon laquelle les mises en scène peuvent être décelées grâce à la transposition du problème sous forme de représentation normalisée. Les vérificateurs qui ont eu recours à une représentation normalisée sont parvenus à percer à jour la mise en scène de la direction, à totaliser les éléments correctement et à déceler la fraude dans tous les cas. Ils ont, pour cela, appliqué des procédés conformes aux normes de vérification généralement reconnues (Institut Canadien des Comptables Agréés, 1988; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1984) pour totaliser les éléments. Les vérificateurs qui ont eu recours à des représentations multiples ont aussi détecté la mise en scène élaborée par la direction dans les quatre cas. Ils n'ont cependant pas appliqué les procédés de totalisation recommandés dans les normes de vérification et ne sont parvenus à détecter la fraude dans aucun des quatre cas.

ABSTRACT: Managers sometimes implement accounting standards (such as the lease standard) opportunistically to move debt off balance sheet. Regulators and standard-setters are considering the adoption of principles-based accounting standards to reduce such opportunism. We report the results of an experiment in which experienced financial managers, with incentives to structure a transaction off balance sheet, take a reporting position on how a lease is to be reported. We manipulate the type of accounting standards (principles-based, rules-based) and the type of auditor (principles-oriented, rules-oriented, or client-oriented). Results show that for a rules-based standard, auditor-type does not influence participants’ propensity to report the transaction off balance sheet. However, for a principles-based standard, auditor-type matters in that this propensity is lowest when the auditor is principles-oriented as opposed to rules- or client-oriented. Our results suggest that a move toward more principles-based standards is likely to result in improved financial reporting quality only when there is a corresponding shift in auditors’ mindsets toward being more principles-oriented.