This study resolves the puzzling evidence on convertible bonds by documenting that conversion-forcing calls are indeed bad news. We find that the common stocks of calling firms substantially underperform their benchmarks by a median of 64% over the five-year post-call period. In contrast, firms that choose not to call their in-the-money convertibles exhibit no long-run abnormal performance. We show that studies drawing conclusions based on short-term price reversal immediately following the call fail to completely capture the valuation effect that occurs over a longer time horizon. We document that the market condition at the time of the call (issuance volume) and cash flow benefits related to the call (relation between dividend and after tax coupon payment) influence the post-call stock price performance. Our analysis also reveals that the post-call underperformance of high-growth firms is more pronounced than that of low-growth firms, indicating greater market exuberance associated with high-growth firms at the time of the call.

Examining stockholder and bondholder wealth of acquirers and sellers, we find that asset sales are firm value enhancing for the seller but value neutral for the acquirer. Although divestitures are typically viewed as more synergistic and friendly transactions than takeovers, we find using a matched acquirer–seller sample, that the net wealth effect from the transaction is not significantly different from zero. However, those transactions that involve high-q bidders and low-q sellers create maximum value for acquirers and for the transaction as a whole. Further, low-q bidder/low-q seller transactions are value destroying. We find that seller gains are only related to the seller’s managerial performance. We document that private lender monitoring enhances transactional value in corporate divestitures. Collectively, the analysis shows that well-managed and highly monitored firms are more likely to benefit from asset sale transactions.