Large U.S. banks dramatically increased their capitalization during the 1990s, to the highest levels in more than 50 years. We document this buildup of capital and evaluate several potential motivations. Our results support the hypothesis that regulatory innovations in the early 1990s weakened conjectural government guarantees and enhanced bank counterparties' incentives to monitor and price default risk. We find no evidence that a bank holding company's (BHC's) market capitalization increases with its asset volatility prior to 1994. Thereafter, the data display a strong cross-sectional relation between capitalization and asset risk.

[We provide evidence that commercial banks extend their reputation in underwriting syndicated loans and private placements (private debt) to their bond-underwriting activities. In the absence of bond market reputation, private-debt-market reputation enables commercial banks to win underwriting mandates from their loan clients. Furthermore, it allows them to credibly commit to investors against opportunistically using lending information and thereby deliver superior certification benefits in the form of higher issue prices relative to investment-bank underwriters. This pricing benefit is not offset by higher underwriting fees and thus results in lower total issuance costs for borrowers.]

The empirical literature provides conflicting assessments about how firms choose their capital structures. Distinguishing among the three main hypotheses (“tradeoff”, pecking order, and market timing) requires that we know whether firms have long-run leverage targets and (if so) how quickly they adjust toward them. Yet many previous researchers have applied empirical specifications that fail to recognize the potential for incomplete adjustment. A more general, partial-adjustment model of firm leverage indicates that firms do have target capital structures. The typical firm closes about one-third of the gap between its actual and its target debt ratios each year.

The re-entry of banking organizations into securities underwriting raises concerns over the possibility of banks using their lending-generated private information to benefit themselves and the issuing firm at the expense of investors. This paper illustrates the use of syndicate structure by lending banks to credibly commit against such opportunistic behavior and to exploit their proprietary information to lower issuance cost for borrowing firm issuers. We show that lending banks predominantly comanage with a high reputation nonlending underwriter. We present evidence that, relative to investment banks, comanaging issues allows lending banks to lower issuance costs for borrowing firms.

We provide evidence that commercial banks extend their reputation in underwriting syndicated loans and private placements (private debt) to their bond-underwriting activities. In the absence of bond market reputation, private-debt-market reputation enables commercial banks to win underwriting mandates from their loan clients. Furthermore, it allows them to credibly commit to investors against opportunistically using lending information and thereby deliver superior certification benefits in the form of higher issue prices relative to investment-bank underwriters. This pricing benefit is not offset by higher underwriting fees and thus results in lower total issuance costs for borrowers.