This paper examines the effects of characteristics of bank underwriters on issue costs in seasoned equity offerings in Japan following deregulation in 1999. I find that banks’ holding loans have a negative effect on price discounts and no effect on underwriting fees. However, banks’ equity holdings have no effect on discount rates and a positive effect on underwriting fees. Furthermore, issuers with unhealthy banks pay higher discount rates, are more likely to be weak in their ex-post operating performance, and are less willing to switch underwriters. I conclude that the characteristics of banks have different effects on issue costs.

This study empirically examines the impact of an exogenous decrease in banks’ shareholding on bank loans and firms’ risk-taking, utilizing a regulatory change in Japan relating to banks’ shareholding as an instrument. We find that an exogenous reduction in a bank’s shareholding decreased the bank’s share of loans in the client firm’s total loans, while it increased the volatility of a firm’s return on assets. The reduction in a bank’s shareholding did not affect firm risk as perceived by equity investors or its borrowing terms. These findings are consistent with the prediction that banks hold equity claims over client firms to gain a competitive advantage, and are weakly compatible with the prediction that banks’ shareholding mitigates shareholder–creditor conflict.

Shareholder perks are in-kind gifts or purchase discounts that disproportionately reward small shareholders. Data from Japanese firms indicate that firms initiating perk programs attract individual retail shareholders and experience increases in share values. We find support for three channels by which perks increase firm value: an increase in share liquidity, a decrease in the equity cost of capital, and signaling to investors. A fourth channel, by which perks help to market the firm’s products to consumers, receives mixed support. We do not find evidence that perk programs work to entrench managers.

By focusing on the price and trading volume movements around the ex-days of shareholder perks, we investigate whether and how investors value shareholder perks. Using comprehensive shareholder perks data from Japan, we demonstrate a significant price decline for stocks with shareholder perks around ex-days, as an evidence that shareholder perks are valuable for investors. We also show that heterogeneous preference for shareholder perks among investors leads to active trading around the ex-day. A price drop larger than the estimated cost of shareholder perks implies that gift giving is welfare increasing, providing a new insight into the long-standing debate on whether gift giving creates welfare gain or loss. This study also provides empirical findings that are consistent with behavioral model of mental accounting, which posits that receiving a gift-in-kind rather than cash or gift cards is utility increasing for consumers.