This study examines Japanese banks’ behavior of adjusting denominators of capital ratios upon the introduction of Basel II regulations. The first analysis investigates the adjustments to the size and composition of portfolios to achieve the target risk-weighted asset (RWA). The second analysis investigates how quickly banks adjust the numerator and denominator of their capital ratio. We find evidence that banks adjusted the composition of their assets faster than their asset size to achieve the RWA targets under the macroeconomic and institutional conditions in Japan. In addition, we find that banks adjusted their level of regulatory capital faster than their RWAs to achieve the capital ratio targets. Furthermore, we find that banks that had less capital surplus shifted their portfolio composition toward lower-risk assets without reducing the total assets. The analyses provide policy implications for the time-varying minimum standards of Basel III.

This paper empirically investigates the role played by relatively small banks in the Japanese local credit market. We test the hypothesis that small banks enhance the recovery rate from the financial distress and reduce the bankruptcy ratio of small firms. Empirical evidence suggests that small banks specialize more in relationship loans to small firms. However, this expertise is limited to the loans to unincorporated firms or those with a very small number of employees.

The principal–agent problem between the regulator, regulated banks, and taxpayers is critical to the viability of the financial system’s safety net. There exists the danger that the regulator will collude with regulated banks to pursue their benefits at the expense of taxpayers, thereby reducing effectiveness of financial supervision. This paper proposes that the human relationship prevailing between the regulatory authorities and private banks referred to as “amakudari” is a form of collusion between the regulator and banks that endangers the safety net mechanism in Japan. Statistical analysis of data on regional banks shows that those banks accepting post-retirement officials from the Ministry of Finance have reduced capital adequacy levels and increased non-performing loans. Thus, the statistical result supports the hypothesis proposed in this paper.