We examine the effects of time-limited disclosure relief under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012. The Act grants newly public firms up to five years of exemptions, and our results suggest that the fixed duration of this relief, as much as its availability, shapes post-IPO behavior. Using an intention-to-treat design, we compare treated firms with smaller reporting companies whose exemptions are similar but carry no fixed expiry date. Equity issuance by treated firms increases significantly as the deadline nears while debt issuance declines, and cash reserves accumulate over the period. Capital expenditure increases relative to controls in the early post-IPO years, while R&D shows no differential response. As expiry approaches, the differential with the control group in internal investment weakens but cash-financed acquisitions accelerate. This shift in investment composition coincides with deteriorating operating performance and declining market valuations relative to IPO levels. Our post-expiry analysis reveals an abrupt reversal in acquisition activity upon transition to full disclosure while internal investment remains unchanged, supporting the argument that pre-expiry behavior was driven by the regulatory timeline rather than natural firm maturation. We conclude that the duration of regulatory relief is as important as its scope in shaping corporate behavior, and that time-limited exemptions from mandatory disclosure can induce anticipatory firm responses that work against the policy's intended objectives.

This study analyzes whether fair value estimates of fund net asset values (NAVs) produced by private equity managers are accurate and unbiased predictors of future discounted cash flows (DCFs). We exploit the fact that private equity funds have finite lives to compare reported NAVs to DCFs based on realized cash flows for 384 Venture Capital (VC) funds and 195 Buyout funds spanning 1988–2016. Findings reveal that Buyout funds' NAVs display little systematic bias, but VC funds' NAVs are relatively aggressively biased compared to Buyout funds, especially since 2000. Accuracy is worse in the first half of the sample period even though NAV estimates generally are more conservative. Overall, the results reveal significant differences in the association between NAVs and DCFs for Buyout versus VC funds, which is particularly important for private equity fund investors in their consideration of the relevance and reliability of NAV estimates provided by fund managers.