We document the heterogeneous effects of turnover on mutual fund performance, which help explain the weak cross-sectional turnover-performance relations reported in existing studies. For funds skilled in exploiting short-term investment opportunities, there is a positive empirical relation between turnover and performance. For unskilled funds, the relation turns negative. As a result, performance persistence is stronger among funds with higher turnover. Further, we find that the heterogeneous effects of turnover on performance are not driven by liquidity premium or trade execution skills, but rather due to substantial dispersion in short-term stock selection information.

This paper argues that a lesser known yet economically significant tax-deferral feature of ETFs’ security design is crucial to their success. By relying on the in-kind redemption exemption, authorized participants help ETFs avoid distributing capital gains and reduce their tax overhang, partly by deploying heartbeat trades. We estimate that the ETF tax efficiency has increased long-term investors’ after-tax returns by 1.05% per year relative to mutual funds in recent years. Exploiting cross-sectional and time-series variations in investors’ tax burden, we show that tax efficiency is a significant driver of capital migration by high-net-worth investors from mutual funds into ETFs.

Open-end mutual funds can use redemption in kind to satisfy investor redemptions by delivering securities instead of cash. We find that funds that reserve their rights to redeem in kind experience less redemption after poor performance. Evidence from actual in-kind transactions reveals several unique mechanisms for redemption in kind to mitigate fund runs, including the delivery of more illiquid stocks and stocks with greater tax overhang. Funds suffer less from the adverse impact of outflows on their performance. However, redeeming investors bear significant liquidation costs when they sell securities, costs associated with destabilization in the prices of these securities.

We examine whether firms' ESG performance is influenced by bondholder preferences. We argue that insurance companies have unique incentives to monitor bond issuers' ESG performance because insurers face enhanced exposures to ESG shocks in their balance sheets and trading operations. Consistent with this argument, we find that firms with higher bond ownership by insurance companies are associated with higher future ESG ratings. To address potential identification concerns, we test changes in bond issuers' ESG ratings following the initial bond investment by insurance companies. We find that firms' ESG performance improves after insurance companies' initial bond investment. We also find that this improvement in ESG performance is concentrated in firms with greater reliance on bond financing and investment capital from insurance companies. Our study underscores the importance of bond ownership structure in influencing corporate ESG performance.