We show that firms that employ the majority voting method for director election exhibit higher institutional ownership than firms that employ the plurality voting method, especially after the 2010 amendment to NYSE Rule 452. Firms that adopt majority voting in a bylaw or charter exhibit increases in institutional ownership and share price. These results are consistent with our conjecture that institutional investors favor companies with majority voting and investors react favorably to the adoption of majority voting because it reduces management monitoring costs by improving the accountability of elected board members.

Using limit order books across all US exchanges, we show that while liquidity for small orders (e.g., the quoted and effective spreads) decreases, liquidity for large orders (e.g., the cumulative depth and the price impact of multiple trades) improves after the implementation of the Tick Size Pilot Program. We find significant spillover effects on liquidity for small and large orders that extend beyond the top of the book. Finally, we show that the pilot program results in an improvement in pricing efficiency, an increase in trade size, and a decrease in the number of trades.