An analysis of new buy and sell recommendations of stocks by security analysts at major U.S. brokerage firms shows significant, systematic discrepancies between prerecommendation prices and eventual values. The initial return at the time of the recommendations is large, even though few recommendations coincide with new public news or provide previously unavailable facts. However, these initial price reactions are incomplete. For buy recommendations, the mean postevent drift is modest (+2.4 percent) and short-lived, but for sell recommendations, the drift is larger (-9.1 percent) and extends for six months. Analysts appear to have market timing and stock picking abilities.

An analysis of new buy and sell recommendations of stocks by security analysts at major U.S. brokerage firms shows significant, systematic discrepancies between prerecommendation prices and eventual values. The initial return at the time of the recommendations is large, even though few recommendations coincide with new public news or provide previously unavailable facts. However, these initial price reactions are incomplete. For buy recommendations, the mean postevent drift is modest (+2.4%) and short‐lived, but for sell recommendations, the drift is larger (−9.1%) and extends for six months. Analysts appear to have market timing and stock picking abilities.

An analysis of stock and sell recommendations by security analysts at fourteen major U.S. brokerage firms shows significant, systematic discrepancies between prices and eventual values, in contrast to the conclusions of many previous studies. The average initial price change at the time of the recommendations is large, even though few recommendations coincide with other public information releases or provide previously unavailable facts. These price changes which are then ostensibly due primarily to information processing and dissemination are consistent with the expanded Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) definition of market efficiency where informed investors earn a return on their information gathering and processing efforts. Furthermore, these initial price reactions are incomplete. Post-recommendation risk-adjusted price drift implies that analysts' recommendations provide tradable value for investors. For recommendations, the mean, post-event drift is modest (+2.4%) and short-lived (one month), but for sell recommendations, the drift is larger (-9.1%), accruing over a longer six-month interval. Analysts appear to have market timing as well as stock picking abilities. Also, accurate industry predictions appear to be an important component for pessimistic recommendations (sell and removed from buy ) but not for optimistic ones (buy and removed from sell).

Market returns before the offer price is set affect the amount and variability of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. Thus an important question is "What IPO procedure is best adapted for controlling underpricing in "hot" versus "cold" market conditions?" The French stock market offers a unique arena for empirical research on this topic, since three substantially different issuing mechanisms (auctions, bookbuilding, and fixed price) are used there. Using 1992-1998 data, we find that the auction mechanism is associated with less underpricing and lower variance of underpricing. We show that the auction procedure's ability to incorporate more information from recent market conditions into the IPO price is an important reason.

[Brokerage analysts frequently comment on and sometimes recommend companies that their firms have recently taken public. We show that stocks that under-writer analysts recommend perform more poorly than "buy" recommendations by unaffiliated brokers prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the recommendation date. We conclude that the recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence of bias. We show also that the market does not recognize the full extent of this bias. The results suggest a potential conflict of interest inherent in the different functions that investment bankers perform.]

[The bookbuilding IPO procedure has captured significant market share from auction alternatives recently, despite the significantly lower costs related to the auction mechanism. In France, where both mechanisms were used in the 1990s, the ostensible advantages of bookbuilding were advertising-related benefits. Book-built issues were more likely to be followed and positively recommended by lead underwriters. Even nonunderwriters' analysts promote book-built issues more in order to curry favor with the IPO underwriter for allocations of future deals. Yet we do not observe valuation or post-IPO return differentials that suggest these types of promotion have any value to the issuing firm.]

In the mid-1990s, 30% of firms completing an SEO within three years of their IPO switched lead underwriter. This article provides evidence on why they switched. Contrary to predictions of prior research, there is little evidence that firms switch due to dissatisfaction with underwriter performance at the time of the IPO. A surprising result is that switchers’ IPOs were significantly less underpriced than non-switchers’ IPOs. However, switchers raised fewer proceeds than expected, compared to the mid-point of the filing range, while non-switchers raised significantly more proceeds. There are two main reasons for switching. Firms graduate to higher reputation underwriters, and they strategically buy additional and influential analyst coverage from the new lead underwriter. Survey results support these conclusions.

This paper examines the value of analysts as industry specialists. We show analysts create value in their recommendations mainly through their ability to rank stocks within industries. An industry-based recommendation strategy substantially improves the return to risk ratio and reduces price momentum tilt relative to portfolios that ignore industry information. An examination of the links among analyst information, aggregated at the industry level, and industry returns and industry momentum shows that industry returns precede industry-aggregated analyst upgrades and downgrades, and the short-term industry price momentum phenomenon is partly explained by returns of firms with more analyst coverage leading those with less in that industry. Recommendation information is not valuable for predicting future relative industry returns, however.

Market returns before the offer price is set affect the amount and variability of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. Thus an important question is “What IPO procedure is best adapted for controlling underpricing in “hot” versus “cold” market conditions?” The French stock market offers a unique arena for empirical research on this topic, since three substantially different issuing mechanisms (auctions, bookbuilding, and fixed price) are used there. Using 1992–1998 data, we find that the auction mechanism is associated with less underpricing and lower variance of underpricing. We show that the auction procedure's ability to incorporate more information from recent market conditions into the IPO price is an important reason.

Brokerage analysts frequently comment on and sometimes recommend companies that their firms have recently taken public. We show that stocks that underwriter analysts recommend perform more poorly than “buy” recommendations by unaffiliated brokers prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the recommendation date. We conclude that the recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence of bias. We show also that the market does not recognize the full extent of this bias. The results suggest a potential conflict of interest inherent in the different functions that investment bankers perform.