[In an extension of the Kyle (1985) model of continuous insider trading, it is shown that asymmetric information can make it impossible to price options by arbitrage. Even when an option would appear to be redundant, its introduction into the market can cause the volatility of the underlying asset to become stochastic. This eliminates the potential for dynamically replicating the option. The change in the price process of the asset reflects a change in the information transmitted by volume and prices when the option is traded.]

[We compare a sealed-bid uniform-price auction (the Treasury's experimental format) with a sealed-bid discriminatory auction (the Treasury's format heretofore), assuming the good is perfectly divisible. We show that the auction theory that prompted the experiment, which assumes single-unit demands, does not adequately describe the bidding game for Treasury securities. Collusive strategies are self-enforcing in uniform-price divisible-good auctions. In these equilibria, the seller's expected revenue is lower than in equilibria of discriminatory auctions.]

In an extension of the Kyle (1985) model of continuous insider trading, it is shown that asymmetric information can make it impossible to price options by arbitrage. Even when an option would appear to be redundant, its introduction into the market can cause the volatility of the underlying asset to become stochastic. This eliminates the potential for dynamically replicating the option. The change in the price process of the asset reflects a change in the information transmitted by volume and prices when the option is traded.

In an extension of the Kyle (1985) model of continuous insider trading, it is shown that asymmetric information can make it impossible to price options by arbitrage. Even when an option would appear to be redundant, its introduction into the market can cause the volatility of the underlying asset to become stochastic. This eliminates the potential for dynamically replicating the option. The change in the price process of the asset reflects a change in the information transmitted by volume and prices when the option is traded.

We compare a sealed-bid uniform-price auction (the Treasury’s experimental format) with a sealed-bid discriminatory auction (the Treasury’s format heretofore), assuming the good is perfectly divisible. We show that the auction theory that prompted the experiment, which assumes single-unit demands, does not adequately describe the bidding game for Treasury securities. Collusive strategies are self-enforcing in uniform-price divisible-good auctions. In these equilibria, the seller’s expected revenue is lower than in equilibria of discriminatory auctions.