Research in incentives has focused on performance measures and pay-performance sensitivities but has largely ignored the “performance standard”, which generates important incentives whenever plan participants can influence the standard-setting process. “Internally determined” standards are directly affected by management actions in the current or prior year, while “externally determined” standards are less easily affected. I show that companies choose external standards when prior performance is a noisy estimate of contemporaneous performance. In addition, companies using budget based and other internally determined performance standards have less-variable bonus payouts, and are more likely to smooth earnings, than companies using externally determined standards.

Although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant-date market price, in practice virtually all options are granted at the money. We offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle, by showing that pay-to-performance incentives for risk-averse undiversified executives are typically maximized by setting exercise prices at (or near) the grant-date market price. We provide an operationally useful alternative to Black-Scholes (1973) for the purpose of both valuing executive stock options and measuring the incentives created by options. Our framework has implications not only for exercise-price policies, but also for indexed options, option repricings, exchanges of cash for stock-based compensation, and the design of bonus plans.

Microsoft's Internet Explorer (JE) technologies are included in Windows at no separate charge. Versions 1 and 2 of IE functioned as add-on features in Windows 95. They were not tightly integrated into Windows and did not make applications programming interfaces available to other software. Over time, IE became increasingly integrated into Windows, sharing code with other Windows features and supplying processing services to other operatingsystem components and to software applications. In addition to distribution as part of Windows, Microsoft has routinely offered free IE distribution and upgrades through other channels. Microsoft has also compensated internet access providers (IAP's) and internet content providers (ICP' s) for their efforts to promote the use and distribution of IE. Despite IE's no-revenue track record and assurances of free availability in the future, Microsoft spends large sums developing and promoting IE. One interpretation of these (and other) facts holds that Microsoft unlawfully tied the browsing functionality of IE to Windows 95 and 98 for anticompetitive purposes. This view rests on the premise that a non-Microsoft web browser could evolve into a substitute for Windows or promote potential substitutes. Of course, the emergence of a substitute would erode the profitability of Windows. Hence, according to this view, Microsoft sought to preclude or forestall the emergence of alternative software platforms by tying its own web browser to Windows and by entering into promotional agreements that raise costs for rival web browsers. As an alternative to this view, we offer a pro-competitive perspective on Microsoft's behavior with respect to IE. Our perspective resonates with several other aspects of Microsoft's behavior as well. It also carries important implications for the connection between market structure and consumer welfare.