I examine how changes in analysts' workloads affect their information production. Examining determinants of analysts' information production is important because analyst research affects stock prices and capital allocation decisions. Using periods when analysts work on IPOs to proxy for shocks to their workloads, I predict and find that the accuracy, quantity, and timeliness of analysts' forecasts for non‐IPO firms decline when they are working on IPOs, and they herd closer to the consensus. The reductions in research quality are larger for less experienced analysts, larger IPOs, and less important portfolio firms. Last, I predict and find that information asymmetry increases for non‐IPO firms covered by analysts who are working on IPOs, consistent with analysts' reduction in research quality during IPO assignments negatively affecting the information environment of non‐IPO firms. In sum, I provide the first evidence that analysts' work on IPO deals imposes negative externalities on both the quality of research they produce for the non‐IPO firms they cover and the information environments of these firms, highlighting at least one reason why analyst workload is important to firms and investors.

We analyze how incentives affect the reporting of fair values using mutual funds’ valuations of Level 3 equity holdings. We conjecture that the observed stickiness of reported values arises because funds defer revaluation until they can make a sufficiently compelling and objective case to avoid costly accusations of aggressive valuation. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that funds’ revaluations of the same security are clustered in time and tightly distributed, and revaluations of non-traded securities are more likely when market returns are larger and the source of those returns is less subjective. In addition, consistent with a greater concern for overvaluation, we document that funds are more likely to reduce valuations of these holdings when market returns are negative. Finally, given the stickiness of valuations, we provide evidence that funds exploit valuation discretion to improve performance rankings through the timing of revaluations rather than through the levels of new values.

We examine the effect of IPO proceeds on post-IPO liquidity and market monitoring. To do so we exploit variation in the amount of proceeds raised that is unrelated to firm size and manager decisions using an instrumental variable approach. We find that marginal increases in IPO proceeds lead to large increases in liquidity, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership in the first two years a firm is public. Increases in IPO proceeds also lead to more frequent follow-on offerings and longer survival as a public firm. We find evidence that immediate shocks to ownership dispersion represent one plausible channel through which changes in IPO proceeds affect long-run liquidity and market monitoring. Overall, our findings support the theoretical liquidity and market quality benefits associated with reductions in ownership concentration.

The JOBS Act allows certain analysts to be more involved in the IPO process, but does not relax restrictions on analyst compensation structure. We find that these analysts initiate coverage that is more optimistically biased, less accurate, and generates smaller stock market reactions. Investors purchasing shares following these initiations lose over 3% of their investment by the firm's subsequent earnings release. By contrast, issuers, analysts, and investment banks appear to benefit from this increased bias, as optimism is more positively associated with proxies for firm visibility and investment banking revenues when analysts are involved in the IPO process.

We test the effect of going public on economic growth in the areas surrounding initial public offering (IPO) firms. We compare the effects of IPO filers that complete their IPOs with those that do not, using post-filing stock market fluctuations as an instrument for IPO completion. We show that IPOs that are large relative to the size of their counties lead to a 1.1 percentage point relative reduction in annual county-level establishment growth, with similar effects for employment and population growth. There are no corresponding effects for relatively small IPOs. These negative effects appear to be driven by a crowding out of local sector peers, but the crowding out also disrupts local agglomerations and slows down growth among other businesses that rely on local demand. Overall, our results indicate that macroeconomic gains from IPOs trade off against disruptions in local agglomeration economies where public firms originate.