Extensive evidence suggests that managers strategically choose the complexity of their descriptive disclosures. However, their motives in doing so appear mixed, as complex disclosures are used to obfuscate in some cases and to provide information in others. Building on these observations, we first identify a novel stylized fact: disclosure complexity is non-monotonic in firm performance. We develop a model of disclosure complexity that incorporates the dual roles of complexity and can explain this stylized fact. In the model, a manager discloses to investors of heterogeneous sophistication and can adjust the complexity of the disclosure to either provide more precise information or to obfuscate. When the firm's investor base is largely unsophisticated, the manager issues a complex disclosure only upon observing negative news. In contrast, when the firm's investor base is more sophisticated, the manager issues a complex disclosure upon observing either highly positive or negative news. As a result, the market may react more positively to complex information releases than to simple releases, complex disclosures generate heightened return volatility, and firms with more inherently complex information are more likely to use their discretion to simplify their disclosures.

In this paper, I develop a measure of the difference in the amount of information that investors expect a forthcoming disclosure to contain should it reveal good news versus bad news (the disclosure’s “asymmetry”). To do so, I first show that this asymmetry is linked to the skewness of returns that the disclosure creates. I then show that this skewness can be measured using a weighted change in option-implied return skewness leading up to the disclosure’s release. The measure’s ability to capture investors’ prior beliefs regarding asymmetry is advantageous when studying ex ante decisions including contracting and information acquisition choices. I implement it on a sample of large firms’ quarterly earnings announcements, finding evidence that investors anticipate cross-sectional but not time-series variation in earnings’ asymmetry.

We study the impact of asymmetric (i.e., conservative or aggressive) disclosure on a firm’s price in the classic setting in which its stock is traded by risk-averse investors and noise or liquidity traders. We show that asymmetric accounting policies alter the relative risk faced by investors when they short versus long, which causes market liquidity to differ for positive versus negative demand shocks. As a result, accounting conservatism raises firms’ valuations and lowers their expected returns. We further demonstrate that the relationship between accounting informativeness and expected returns depends upon the skewness of investors’ prior beliefs. Finally, we find that a firm that can commit to an accounting policy can tailor this policy to benefit from noise trade and foster overvaluation.