This study investigates whether firms in China use corporate social responsibility (CSR) to build political networks and, if so, how such CSR decisions affect firm performance. We bypass the empirical difficulty of measuring the value of political networks by using an event study approach. Specifically, we examine how abrupt termination of existing political connections caused by replacement of city mayors affect Chinese listed companies' CSR choices. We find that when a mayor is replaced, the level of and the propensity for CSR activity increase. Such increases are more prominent in firms for which political connections are more valuable, namely, nonstate-controlled firms, smaller firms, and firms operating in cities ruled by more corrupt government. In addition, we find that firms that spend resources to bond with a new government via CSR activities are rewarded: these firms receive higher levels of government subsidies or have a greater propensity to receive future government subsidies. These firms also outperform firms that do not invest in political networking via CSR. Our study adds direct evidence to how and through what channel CSR affects firm performance. We also contribute to the CSR literature on politically motivated CSR strategies.

Prior studies document that politically connected independent directors (“political IDs”) bring both benefits (e.g., easier access to long-term debt financing) and costs to firms (e.g., greater minority shareholder expropriations), but the observed relationship may be spurious because board composition is endogenously determined. Moreover, no direct evidence shows how minority shareholders value these political IDs. Using an exogenous shock that forces firms to lose their political IDs, we investigate the value of political IDs for Chinese listed companies. Specifically, using a difference-in-difference methodology, we find that the mandated departures of political IDs lead to reduced long-term debt financing and decreased government subsidies for nonstate-owned listed companies. Nonstate-owned listed companies that experience the sudden loss of political IDs adapt to the shock and improve their minority shareholder protections by engaging in fewer self-dealing activities and by enhancing investment efficiency. Although minority shareholders experience greater levels of expropriation in the presence of political IDs, they react negatively to the forced departure of political IDs. This evidence suggests that minority shareholders weigh the loss of political ties over the potential gain of corporate governance improvement. Our study provides direct evidence on how political IDs affect firms' strategic decisions. The study also sheds light on political IDs' roles in facilitating rent-seeking by controlling shareholders.