Materiality has important implications for voluntary disclosures when there is an affirmative duty to disclose. Using a change in rules on the disclosure of advertising costs, Heitzman et al. (2009) empirically demonstrate that, indeed, it is important to factor in the effect of the materiality constraint on firms’ disclosure behavior. This discussion reviews the contributions and limitations of Heitzman et al. (2009).

Viewing the detection of earnings management from the perspective of a crime scene investigator sheds new light on prior research on earnings management and its close relative, earnings quality. The works of Ball and Shivakumar [2008. Earnings quality at initial public offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, in press.] and Teoh et al. [1998. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, 1935–1974.] are used to illustrate the application of seven components of a crime scene investigation to earnings management research.

The 1992 revision of executive compensation disclosure rules in the U.S. could have benefited shareholders by inducing corporate governance improvements or harmed them by increasing disclosure costs. Consistent with the governance improvement hypothesis, companies that lobbied against the regulation had, relative to control firms: (i) return-on-assets and return-on-equity that improved by 0.5% and 3%, respectively; and (ii) excess stock returns of 6% over the 8-month period between the announcement and the adoption of the proposed regulation. Also, firms lobbying more vigorously against the proposal had more positive abnormal stock returns during events that increased the probability of regulation.

Accounting research frequently uses R2, for example, to measure value relevance. We show analytically that scale effects present in levels regressions increase R2, and this effect increases in the scale factor's coefficient of variation. Thus, between-sample comparisons of R2 are invalid, unless one controls for differences in the scale factor's coefficient of variation. Applying our analysis to prior research, we show that the documented increase in value relevance of accounting is attributable to increases in the coefficient of variation of the scale factor. Controlling for this effect, there has been a decline in value relevance, as measured by R2.

ABSTRACT We examine the impact of Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) on financial analysts. We hypothesize and find that analysts are more pessimistic, less precise, and more asymmetric in their boldness in the fall, as indicated by their forecasts of quarterly earnings. The effects are apparent in all forecast horizons analyzed and robust across multiple specifications. Importantly, pessimism in fall forecast revisions shows analyst-specific persistence, providing a strong indication that the effect is a result of SAD rather than other coincident factors. We also find evidence of a reversal in pessimism in the spring. Additional analyses show that analyst forecasts exhibit less seasonality than equity returns, and that the presence of analyst forecasts in the fall is associated with attenuation in the seasonal pattern in stock returns. Overall, the evidence suggests that SAD affects both financial analysts and equity investors, but the effect on the latter is stronger. JEL Classifications: G11; G12; G14; G41; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.

ABSTRACT We hypothesize that insiders strategically choose disclosure policies and the timing of their equity trades to maximize trading profits, subject to the litigation costs associated with disclosure and insider trading. Accounting for endogeneity between disclosures and trading, we find that when managers plan to purchase shares, they increase the number of bad news forecasts to reduce the purchase price. In addition, this relation is stronger for trades initiated by chief executive officers than for those initiated by other executives. Confirming this strategic behavior, we find that managers successfully time their trades around bad news forecasts, buying fewer shares beforehand and more afterwards. We do not find that managers adjust their forecasting activity when they are selling shares, consistent with higher litigation concerns associated with insider sales. Overall, our evidence suggests that insiders do exploit voluntary disclosure opportunities for personal gain, but only selectively, when litigation risk is sufficiently low.

We explore how the readability of annual reports varies with earnings management. Using the Fog Index to measure readability (Li, 2008), and focusing on the management discussion and analysis section of the annual report (MD&A), we predict and find that firms most likely to have managed earnings to beat the prior year's earnings have MD&As that are more complex. This disruption of the overall pattern of readability increasing with the level of earnings found in Li (2008) challenges the ontological explanation that good news is inherently easier to communicate, and shows that obfuscation contributes to making disclosures more complex.

We examine the relationship between analyst research and corporate earnings announcements to explore the relative importance of information discovery versus interpretation of previously released information. Using equity market reaction to capture information content, we find that information discovery (interpretation) dominates in the week before (after) firms announce their earnings. In addition, we find that the interpretation role increases in importance with the difficulty of financial accounting information. Analysis of all weeks surrounding earnings announcements shows that the information discovery role is overall more important. We are able to reconcile this result with the opposite finding in Francis et al. (2002).

We examine the effect of earnings surprises on changes in information asymmetry. We hypothesize and find that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast. The relations between earnings surprises and information asymmetry are stronger when the surprises are more likely to capture investors’ attention. Examining the source of these changes, we show that decreased information search activities is the most important factor for asymmetry declining after positive surprises; for negative surprises, decreased uninformed trading plays a dominant role increasing asymmetry.