I report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the influence of noncredible communications and group affiliation on auditors' formation of self-serving bias. I find that manager-subjects use noncredible communications to induce auditors to develop an unwarranted trust of managers (i.e., a biased judgment). However, the bias is neutralized when auditor-subjects belong to groups that create social pressure to conform to group norms. Thus, my finding calls into question the Bazerman et al. (1997) conclusion that auditors cannot conduct impartial audits due to self-serving biases resulting from repeated interactions between auditors and their clients.

This study examines call option values implicit in U.S. corporate bonds from 1973 to 1994. The average call option value is 2.25% of par. Over time, call values remain close to zero until one year before the first call date, reach a maximum at the beginning of the callable period, and slowly decrease thereafter. The determinants of call values are examined. The results show that bonds of firms that have called aggressively in the past have larger call values. Additionally, lower interest rates, smaller slopes of the yield curve, and higher interest rate volatility lead to larger call values. The results also show that call values increase with time to maturity in the callable period but decrease with time to maturity in the call protection period. Lower rated, higher coupon bonds have larger call values. There is no evidence that the length of the call protection period affects call values.

Colombia used lotteries to distribute vouchers which partially covered the cost of private secondary school for students who maintained satisfactory academic progress. Three years after the lotteries, winners were about 10 percentage points more likely to have finished 8th grade, primarily because they were less likely to repeat grades, and scored 0.2 standard deviations higher on achievement tests. There is some evidence that winners worked less than losers and were less likely to marry or cohabit as teenagers. Benefits to participants likely exceeded the $24 per winner additional cost to the government of supplying vouchers instead of public-school places.