The Schumpeterian opportunity cost hypothesis predicts that firms concentrate innovative activities in recessions. However, empirical evidence suggests that innovative activities are procyclical. Theory proposes that firms shift R&D investments and innovation from recessions to booms to maximize returns by capturing high-demand periods before imitators compete away rents. This paper provides the first empirical test of these predictions. Results indicate that R&D spending is more procyclical in industries with faster obsolescence, where matching invention to demand is more valuable, and innovation is more procyclical in industries with weaker IP protection, where imitation poses a greater threat.

While neoclassical models assume static cost-minimization by firms, agency models suggest that firms may not minimize costs in less-competitive or regulated environments. We test this using a transition from cost-of-service regulation to market-oriented environments for many US electric generating plants. Our estimates of input demand suggest that publicly owned plants, whose owners were largely insulated from these reforms, experienced the smallest efficiency gains, while investor-owned plants in states that restructured their wholesale electricity markets improved the most. The results suggest modest medium-term efficiency benefits from replacing regulated monopoly with a market-based industry structure.