This paper examines trading volume on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Traditional theory suggests that taxes create strong incentives to delay realization of capital gains and accelerate realization of losses. Contrary to the theory, we find strong evidence that turnover is higher for stocks with gains (winners) than for stocks with losses (losers). In particular, the winner stocks of keiretsu firms tend to have high end-of-fiscal-year turnover. This is true even when realizing gains could result in higher tax liabilities. We conclude that capital gains taxes have only a small impact on turnover in Japan. Other non-tax-related motives, especially window dressing, appear to dominate investor behavior. We find strong evidence that this window dressing is concentrated in the stock of keiretsu firms.

[We provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of stock price behavior around the ex-dividend day in Japan. We find that prices rise on the ex-day and that dividend-related tax effects appear to be secondary. Returns around ex-dividend days are dominated by the proximity of many ex-days to the fiscal year end. Excess returns of 1 percent, which are independent of any dividend-related considerations, are higher than round-trip transaction costs on medium-sized transactions. Prices seem to imply selling pressure before and buying pressure at the start of the new fiscal year. These trading patterns appear to be motivated by intercorporate manipulative trading around the end of the firms' fiscal year, which are unrelated to dividends.]

We provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of stock price behavior around the ex-dividend day in Japan. We find that prices rise on the ex-day and that dividend-related tax effects appear to be secondary. Returns around ex-dividend days are dominated by the proximity of many ex-days to the fiscal year end. Excess returns of 1 percent, which are independent of any dividend-related considerations, are higher than round-trip transaction costs on medium-sized transactions. Prices seem to imply selling pressure before and buying pressure at the start of the new fiscal year. These trading patterns appear to be motivated by intercorporate manipulative trading around the end of the firms’ fiscal year, which are unrelated to dividends.

Little attention has been paid by the academic community in the United States to the Japanese stock market and its structure. Japan has the second largest economy in the Western world, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) is second only to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in terms of aggregate market values and sales volume. Analysis of the Japanese stock market is useful given its relative importance, but, in addition, examination of the Japanese market may offer insights into controversies surrounding U.S. markets. This study focuses on two such current controversies: the January and size anomalies.

In sharp contrast to results in the United States, the average stock price response to an announcement of a seasoned equity issue in Japan is positive. Offer prices in Japan, unlike the United States, are announced several days before the beginning of the subscription period and incorporate a substantial discount. We suggest that the positive announcement effects in Japan are consistent with the underwriter's certification of the issuing firm's value. We characterize the underwriter's risk as a put option and find a positive association between the underwriter's risk and the announcement returns, as well as other results consistent with underwriter certification.

Peek and Rosengren [Peek, J., Rosengren, E., 2005. Unnatural selection: Perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan. American Economic Review 95, 1144–1166] showed that, when the bubble economy era ended, regulatory forbearance and perverse incentives allowed Japanese banks to engage extensively in evergreening. This is the first comprehensive study to empirically analyze the economics of private debt restructurings of financially distressed companies in Japan, where the corporate monitoring mechanism is not market based but large-stakeholder based – typically, banks and affiliated companies. These stakeholders are expected to efficiently resolve potential bankruptcy or collapse with better information resulting from long-term relationships with the distressed firms. Our study, however, finds that private restructurings led by them failed because of delays in implementing fundamental solutions. Forbearance in addressing the needs of distressed firms demonstrates the weakness of such stakeholders in instituting discipline, hence the need for a system to “monitor the monitor”.

In sharp contrast to results in the United States, the average stock price response to an announcement of a seasoned equity issue in Japan is positive. Offer prices in Japan, unlike the United States, are announced several days before the beginning of the subscription period and incorporate a substantial discount. We suggest that the positive announcement effects in Japan are consistent with the underwriter's certification of the issuing firm's value. We characterize the underwriter's risk as a put option and find a positive association between the underwriter's risk and the announcement returns, as well as other results consistent with underwriter certification.

In May 1997, the Japanese Commercial Code was amended to allow firms to begin granting stock options as compensation to top management and employees. Nearly 350 firms adopted option-based compensation plans between 1997 and 2001. These options typically have five-year lives and are out-of-the-money by about 5% at the grant date. Firms exhibit abnormal stock returns of about 2% around the announcements of plan adoptions. We find improvements in operating performance and observe that dividend policy and volatility remain unchanged post-adoption. Our evidence suggests that well-designed incentive compensation plans are consistent with the creation of shareholder value.