Journal Article On the Symmetry of Robinson Elasticities of Substitution: The General Case Get access Kiyoshi Kuga Kiyoshi Kuga Osaka University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 46, Issue 3, July 1979, Pages 527–531, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297018 Published: 01 July 1979 Article history Received: 01 July 1977 Accepted: 01 May 1978 Published: 01 July 1979

[This paper presents a new version of the factor-price equalization theorem. The numbers of outputs and of factor inputs are allowed to be unmatched. The domestic factor prices in a country facing the international commodity prices are uniquely determined in the neoclassical framework once the factor endowment is taken as given. This allows the factor-price equalization proposition to maintain the invariance of the derivatives of the social production possibility schedule with respect to input parameter perturbations, considering the possible repercussions in the outputs. A necessary and sufficient condition for this invariance is presented in terms of second derivatives of the social production possibility frontier with its economic interpretation. This condition is applied to the non-joint production case. The paper asserts that the equalization theorem holds true if the constant-returns to scale production functions are strictly concave except along rays and satisfy the full-rank condition on the input-coefficient matrix, and if the number of commodities is no less than that of factors. Several other varieties are also presented including the joint production case.]

Akio Kagawa, Kiyoshi Kuga; Notes and Comments: On Professor Hahn's Tâtonnement Stability Theorem: Comment and Example, The Review of Economic Studies, Volu

The purpose of this paper is to give a systematic account of the significance that antagonism among opinions of individuals has on the theory of social choice. We define an intensity of antagonism among individuals and an index of possibility of constructing social welfare functions, and show that when there is less antagonism in a society, then there is more possibility of constructing social welfare functions. Since antagonism is an opposite concept to similarity, this relation can be viewed as a formal realization of Arrow's assertion [1, Ch. 7] that sets preference similarity as the basis of social welfare judgement.

I. Introduction, 657. — II. The model, 658. — III. Reduction of the system, 660, — IV. The accumulation equations, 660. — V. Global stability, 660. — Appendix, 664.