This paper investigates the relationship between dividends and the ownership and control structure of the firm. For a panel of Austrian firms over the 1991/99 period, we find that state-controlled firms engage in dividend smoothing, while family-controlled firms do not. The latter choose significantly lower target payout levels. Consistently, state-controlled firms are most reluctant and family-controlled firms are least reluctant to cut dividends when cuts are warranted. The dividend behavior of bank- and foreign-controlled firms lies in between state- and family-controlled firms. This is consistent with the expected “ranking” of information asymmetries and managerial agency costs. The above results hold for firms with good investment opportunities. We find that firms with low growth opportunities optimally disgorge cash irrespective of who controls the firm.

This article makes two important contributions to the literature on the incentive effects of insider ownership. First, it presents a clean method for separating the positive wealth effect of insider ownership from the negative entrenchment effect, which can be applied to samples of companies from the US and any other country. Second, it measures the effects of insider ownership using a measure of firm performance, namely a marginal q, which ensures that the causal relationship estimated runs from ownership to performance. The article applies this method to a large sample of publicly listed firms from the Anglo-Saxon and Civil law traditions and confirms that managerial entrenchment has an unambiguous negative effect on firm performance as measured by both Tobin's (average) q and our marginal q, and that the wealth effect of insider ownership is unambiguously positive for both measures. We also test for the effects of ownership concentration for other categories of owners and find that while institutional ownership improves the performance in the USA, financial institutions have a negative impact in other Anglo-Saxon countries and in Europe.

Merger control authorities may approve a merger based on an “efficiency defense.” An important aspect in clearing mergers is that the efficiencies need to be merger-specific. Joint ventures, and in particular research joint ventures (RJVs), may achieve comparable efficiencies possibly without the anticompetitive (market power) effects of mergers. We empirically account for the endogenous formation of mergers and RJVs and provide evidence that at the semiconductor level, mergers and RJVs achieve dominant (net) efficiency effects. Our counterfactuals provide evidence that the efficiency gains caused by mergers would have been achieved by RJVs as well. Therefore, RJVs often represent viable alternatives to mergers from the consumer welfare point of view. At the more disaggregate level we find that the efficiency effects are larger in the microcomponents than in the memory market. This finding emphasizes the importance of market determinants (such as product differentiation and entry) having an impact on efficiency and market power effects.

The unique natural experiment of the fall of the iron curtain led to large institutional and governance differences across countries. This allows us to observe the evolution of ownership and control after an initial shock. We utilize this cross-time/cross-country variation in institutions and privatization methods to analyze the determinants and effects of individual investor control in a large sample of firms in 11 CEE countries over the period 2000–2007. Controlling for possible endogeneity and firm effects, we find that large individual investors add value to the firms they control. They do so predominantly compared to state controlled firms but also compared to other privately controlled firms. If large individual investor firms employ professional managers and (only) supervise them actively, they achieve the better performance improvements in Tobin's q than the firms managed by their controlling shareholders. Concerning the determinants of ownership, large individual shareholders substitute for missing good country governance institutions, and ownership is very sticky, since initial conditions (privatization methods) still matter. It appears that secondary markets do not converge on the same ownership equilibria as primary markets do.

We derive empirical predictions from the standard investment-cash flow framework on the functioning of internal capital markets (ICM), but circumvent its criticism by focusing on parent cash flow and investment opportunities. We test these predictions using a unique dataset of parent firms and their listed and unlisted subsidiaries in 90 countries over the period 1995–2006. We find that company and country institutional structures matter. (1) Ownership participation of the parent firm in the subsidiary plays a crucial role for the proper functioning of ICMs. The larger the ownership stake of the parent, the better the functioning of the ICM. (2) The best functioning cross-border ICMs can be found in the sub-sample of firms with parents from a country with “strong” institutions and subsidiaries from a country with “weak” institutions. (3) Unlisted subsidiaries are much more dependent on the ICMs their parents provide than listed subsidiaries. Thus, ICMs are not per se “bright” or “dark”, their proper functioning depends on how they are set up.