In this paper we model the derivative strategies optimally undertaken by a manager (or head of a profit center in a hedge fund) when the detailed derivative positions taken are not contractible. We show that with commonly-used incentive features in the compensation structure, managers have incentives to implement complex derivative strategies that lead to a slight reduction in default probabilities (or a slight increase in performance measures) with a high probability at the cost of allowing for the possibility of disaster states involving large losses, although with a very small probability. Such disaster states cause systemic instability (similar to the experience of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998). We discuss possible audit strategies, governance mechanisms and incentive structures that will ameliorate the probability of systemic instability arising from such incentives in a market with a rich enough menu of derivatives. We characterize the optimal intensity of audit effort with and without the presence of such derivative strategies. The dependence of the optimal audit intensity on the legal liability regime and different rules for apportioning the auditor's liability is derived. Our results also relate the optimal audit intensity to the cost and efficiency parameters of the audit firm.

The paper provides sufficient conditions under which a nonrandom economic variable specific to some asset (the dependent variable) can be represented as a linear combination of the betas of some random characteristics of the asset (the independent variables) with some economy-wide factors. This generalizes Ross' APT that proves the above in the case where the dependent variables are expected returns and the independent variables are returns. This generalization will provide a theoretical basis for many existing multibeta relationships beyond the setting of asset pricing models and, thus, motivate their wider use in empirical and theoretical research.

The Arrow-Debreu approach to general equilibrium in an economy has been recognized as one of the most general and conceptually elegant frameworks for the study of financial problems under uncertainty [2], [9]. Equally well known is its elusiveness when it comes to ready application to practical problems (like capital budgeting) or empirical testing. (See [6], [15]–[18].) However, some recent research (see [1], [3], [6], [12]–[16], [18], and [19]) has made a serious attempt to put the state-preference theoretic model in an operational setting. Breeden and Litzenberger [6] have developed an interesting approach to derive constructively the prices of elementary Arrow-Debreu securities from the prices of call options on aggregate consumption. Banz and Miller [3] use a similar technique to value capital budgeting projects based on values for state-contingent claims computed from prices of call options written on the market portfolio. The “supershare†securities proposed by Hakansson [14]–[16] and related work by Garman [13], Ross [24], etc., have also served to give the so-called “state-contingent†approach a practical flavor.

[We test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors' divergence of opinion on a target's equity value. We show that the total takeover premium, the preannouncement target stock price run-up, and the post-announcement stock price markup are all higher when investors have higher divergence of opinion. We obtain identical results with higher market-level investor sentiment. When divergence of opinion is higher, a firm is less likely to be a takeover target, although takeover synergy in successful takeovers is higher. Our results suggest that takeovers may play a role in explaining high contemporaneous stock prices in the presence of high divergence of investor opinion.]

[We derive the optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowing firm's uninformed stakeholders depend on the bank to establish whether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholders are necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensure that it cannot collude with a healthy firm's owners to seek unnecessary concessions or to collude with a distressed firm's owners to claim that the firm is healthy. To prove that a request for concessions has not come from a healthy firm/bank coalition, the bank must hold either a very small or a very large equity stake when the firm enters distress. To prove that a distressed firm and the bank have not colluded to claim that the firm is healthy, the bank may need to hold equity under routine financial conditions.]