I study the effects of an increase in the supply of local mortgage credit on house prices by exploiting a natural experiment from Switzerland. In 2008, retail customers migrate deposits from universal banks that are suffering overseas losses to homogeneous and narrowly-local mortgage banks. Using the distance between the two types of banks as an instrument for deposit growth, I show that local mortgage banks increase mortgage lending, which correlates with subsequent house price growth in their markets. My results highlight that bank specialization plays an important role in the allocation of capital.

ABSTRACT Using supervisory data on the loan portfolios of large U.S. banks, we document that these banks specialize by concentrating their lending disproportionately in a few industries. This specialization is consistent with banks having industry‐specific knowledge, reflected in reduced risk of loan defaults, lower aggregate charge‐offs, and higher propensity to lend to opaque firms in the preferred industry. Banks attract high‐quality borrowers by offering generous loan terms in their specialized industry, especially to borrowers with alternative options. Banks focus on their preferred industry in times of instability and relatively lower Tier 1 capital as well as after surges in deposits.

We make use of rich U.S. data to show that debt overhang significantly reduces firm asset-, capex-, and employee-growth. We show these contractions are likely driven by firm decisions as opposed to the result of credit constraints or changes in investment opportunities. Our measure of overhang – liabilities to cash flow — aligns with traditional theory and focuses on the importance of a firm’s debt servicing capacity. It further allows us to capitalize on the COVID-19 shock as a quasi-natural experiment to confirm the impact of overhang on firm investment and growth.

We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to understand whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail in a major financial crisis. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits almost exclusively decline for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that banks are better informed about which fellow banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing liquidity even during times of severe financial distress.

We study how competition between asymmetrically informed banks, one specialized and one nonspecialized, affects loan prices. Both banks possess “general” signals regarding the borrower’s quality, which they use to screen loans. The specialized bank also has access to a “specialized” signal on which it bases its loan pricing. This private information-based pricing makes the specialized bank bid more aggressively, mitigating the informational rent effect that gives it monopolistic power. Our findings explain why loans from specialized lenders feature lower interest rates and better ex post performance. Supporting empirical evidence emphasizes the role of specialized information in shaping credit market outcomes.