In a sample of 251 Swedish IPOs, evidence is provided that employees, customers, suppliers, and others with non-arm length connections with the issuing firm and the investment bank are favored investors. The allocation suggests that underpricing serves as indirect compensation. The hypothesis is supported by the significant drop in average initial return from 41% to 8% around a regulatory tax change which reduced the incentive to favor employees of the issuing firm and of the investment bank. The paper concludes that the tax wedge between ordinary income and capital gains contributed to a portion of the underpricing before the regulatory change.

The relative prices of shares that differ only in their voting rights are modelled. In our model, voting rights become valuable when a control contest is decided through takeover bids for outside votes. The study shows how the value of the voting right depends on the initial ownership distribution, the share structure, and the ability of the incumbent manager versus a rival for control. Empirical support for the model is provided using Swedish stock market data.

Swedish government lottery bonds have coupon payments determined by lottery. They offer a unique opportunity to study a security with uncertain payoffs having a known, observable distribution. The risk associated with the lotteries is idiosyncratic by construction and should not command a risk premium in equilibrium. The bonds are traded in two forms, allowing us to evaluate the rewards to bearing extra lottery risk. Despite its idiosyncratic nature, we find prices appear to reflect aversion to this risk. We evaluate the empirical determinants of this differential pricing and possible explanations for it.

Swedish government lottery bonds have coupon payments determined by lottery. They offer a unique opportunity to study a security with uncertain payoffs having a known, observable distribution. The risk associated with the lotteries is idiosyncratic by construction and should not command a risk premium in equilibrium. The bonds are traded in two forms, allowing us to evaluate the rewards to bearing extra lottery risk. Despite its idiosyncratic nature, we find prices appear to reflect aversion to this risk. We evaluate the empirical determinants of this differential pricing and possible explanations for it.

Lottery bonds are Danish Treasury obligations which make coupon payments by lottery. Professional traders have a tax preference for the coupon lottery, while investors are tax-neutral and take the other side of the trade. Consistent with tax-based explanations of abnormal ex-day returns, we find that prices fall by more than the lottery mean. Surprisingly, we also find that the price drop over the lottery decreases with the lottery variance. This suggests that investors do not like the lottery. In fact, the Danish Treasury has been able to sell more lottery bonds only by offering above market interest rates. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G12, G35, G63.

We study shareholder voting on management proposals. We build on a simple model of strategic voting, provide structural estimates of its parameters, and derive testable implications. The evidence suggests that voting is strategic in the sense that shareholders take into account the information of other shareholders when making their voting decisions. We conclude that strategic voting prevents incorrect rejections of management proposals.