Abstract I exploit a Dutch reform in the regulatory discount curve that makes the liabilities of pension funds and insurance companies (P&Is) more sensitive to changes in 20-year interest rates but less so to longer maturity rates. Following the reform, P&Is reduced their longest maturity bond holdings but increased those with 20-year maturities, steepening the long end of the yield curve. Using the reform as a shock to identify price elasticities of demand at the sector level based on holdings across maturity buckets and time, I show that banks are more price elastic than other investors and absorb demand shocks.

Abstract We solve a flexible model that captures transactions costs and infrequencies of trading opportunities for illiquid assets to better understand the shadow costs of illiquidity for different origins of asset illiquidity and heterogeneous investor types. We show that illiquidity that results in suboptimal asset allocation carries low shadow costs, whereas these costs are high when illiquidity restricts consumption. As a result, the shadow costs are high for short-term investors, investors who face substantial liquidity shocks, and investors who desire to allocate a large fraction of their wealth to illiquid assets.