A global trend towards automated trading systems raises the important question of whether execution costs are, in fact, lower than on trading floors. This paper compares the trade execution costs of similar stocks in an automated trading structure (Paris Bourse) and a floor‐based trading structure (NYSE). Results indicate that execution costs are higher in Paris than in New York after controlling for differences in adverse selection, relative tick size, and economic attributes across samples. These results suggest that the present form of the automated trading system may not be able to fully replicate the benefits of human intermediation on a trading floor.

We study block trades in the corporate bond market, where dealers buy or sell blocks from initiating customers and offset their positions with receiving investors. Our findings indicate that while receivers benefit from trading cost savings, they primarily bear adverse selection costs and experience worse outcomes when informed trading is prevalent. Mandatory trade reporting improves receiver outcomes by revealing dealers’ private information, but the benefits are reduced when reporting is delayed. Our results emphasize the importance of transparency regime design and suggest potential market fragility: if information asymmetry becomes severe, receivers may withdraw from the block market.

The proliferation of electronic limit order books operating without dealers raises questions regarding the need for intermediaries with affirmative obligations to maintain markets. We develop a simple model of dealer participation and test it using a sample of less liquid firms that trade on the Paris Bourse. The results indicate that firms with designated dealers exhibit better market quality, and that younger firms, smaller firms, and less volatile firms choose a designated dealer. Around the announcement of dealer introduction, stocks experience an average cumulative abnormal return of nearly 5% that is positively correlated with improvements in liquidity. Overall, these findings emphasize the potential benefits of designing better market structures, even within electronic limit order books, and suggest that purely endogenous liquidity provision may not be optimal for all securities.

We conjecture that macro-level institutions affect equity trading costs through their impact on information risk and investor participation. In a study of trading costs for 412 NYSE-listed American Depository Receipts (ADRs) from 44 countries, we find that, after controlling for firm-level determinants of trading costs, effective spreads and price impact of trades are significantly lower for stocks from countries with better ratings for judicial efficiency, accounting standards, and political stability. Trading costs are significantly higher for stocks from French civil law countries than from common law countries. Overall, we conclude that improvements in legal and political institutions will lower the cost of liquidity in financial markets.

We conjecture that macro-level institutions affect equity trading costs through their impact on information risk and investor participation. In a study of trading costs for 412 NYSE-listed American Depository Receipts (ADRs) from 44 countries, we find that, after controlling for firm-level determinants of trading costs, effective spreads and price impact of trades are significantly lower for stocks from countries with better ratings for judicial efficiency, accounting standards, and political stability. Trading costs are significantly higher for stocks from French civil law countries than from common law countries. Overall, we conclude that improvements in legal and political institutions will lower the cost of liquidity in financial markets.

In October 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in an effort to reduce selective disclosure of material information by firms to analysts and other investment professionals. We find that the information asymmetry reflected in trading costs at earnings announcements has declined after Regulation FD, with the decrease more pronounced for smaller and less liquid stocks. Return volatility around mandatory announcements is also lower but overall information flow is unchanged when mandatory and voluntary announcements are combined. Thus, the SEC appears to have diminished the advantage of informed investors, without increasing volatility.

Using audit-trail data from the Toronto Stock Exchange, we find that market makers scale back in unison when market conditions are unfavorable, which contributes to covariation in liquidity supply, both within and across stocks. Market conditions lower aggregate participation via their impact on trading profits and risk. Contrary to regulatory view, higher stock volatility is associated with more participation and higher profits, even after controlling for other market conditions, including stock volume. Fragility concerns extend to larger stocks and to active participants. The designated market maker mitigates periodic illiquidity created by synchronous withdrawal of market makers in large and small stocks.

We examine the Paris Bourse, whose electronic limit order market closely resembles the downstairs markets envisioned by theorists, to test several theoretical predictions regarding upstairs trading. We present direct evidence in support of the Grossman (J. Business (1992) 509) prediction that upstairs brokers lower execution costs by tapping into unexpressed liquidity, as actual execution costs upstairs are on average only 20% (35%) as large as they would be if block trades were executed against displayed (displayed and hidden) liquidity in the downstairs limit order book. Consistent with prior analyses, the Paris data also support the Seppi (J. Finance (1990) 73) hypothesis that upstairs brokers certify trades as uninformed. We also find that participants in stocks with less restrictive crossing rules agree to outside-the-quote executions for more difficult trades and at times when downstairs liquidity is lacking. These likely represent trades that could not have been otherwise completed, suggesting that market quality can be enhanced by allowing participants more flexibility to execute blocks at prices outside the quotes.

[Using a proprietary dataset of institutional investors' equity transactions, we document that institutional trading desks can sustain relative performance over adjacent periods.We find that trading-desk skill is positively correlated with the performance of the institution's traded portfolio, suggesting that institutions that invest resources in developing execution abilities also invest in generating superior investment ideas. Although some brokers can deliver better executions consistently over time, our analysis suggests that trading-desk skill is not limited to a selection of better brokers. We conclude that the trade implementation process is economically important and can contribute to relative portfolio performance.]

In this article, we survey the literature that studies fixed-income trading rules and outcomes, including Treasury securities, corporate and municipal bonds, and structured credit products. We compare and contrast the microstructure and regulation of fixed-income markets with equity markets. We highlight the nature of over-the-counter trading in the face of search costs and the associated slow evolution of electronically facilitated intermediation. We discuss the databases available to study fixed-income microstructure, as well as measures and determinants of trading costs, and the important roles dealer networks and limited transparency play. We also highlight unresolved issues.