This study examines whether and how firms' voluntary forward‐looking nonfinancial disclosure, specifically their corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure, is associated with the intensity of product market competition (PMC). Despite the importance of the proprietary cost argument in explaining corporate disclosure incentives, there is little empirical evidence of the relationship between firms' proprietary cost concerns and their voluntary nonfinancial disclosure decisions. Using a reduction in industry‐level import tariffs as an exogenous shock to competition intensity, we find that the likelihood, frequency, and length of stand‐alone CSR reports decrease in response to heightened PMC. We also find that higher PMC intensity is associated with a reduced likelihood of CSR disclosure with external assurance, CSR disclosure in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines, and CSR disclosure integrated with financial statements. Our results are robust to multiple alternative measures of PMC—namely, the level of nonprice competition, product similarity, and managers' perceptions of competition. Further analysis suggests that firms facing intense competition tend to commit more resources to advertising activities after reducing their CSR disclosure, presumably to mitigate the effect of this reduction. Overall, our findings suggest that proprietary cost concerns reduce firms' incentive to report their competition‐sensitive CSR activities.

In this study, we examine whether a country's implementation of major corporate governance reforms affects firms' cross-listing activities. Cross-listing is important in overcoming international investment barriers and thus it is worth investigating whether enhanced corporate governance at the country level contributes to the integration of international capital markets. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design, we predict and find that following the implementation of corporate governance reforms in their home countries, firms are more likely to engage in cross-listing activities and tend to cross-list in host countries with stronger investor protection and more developed markets than those in countries with no reforms in the same period. The results from country-level cross-sectional tests indicate that this effect is greater for firms in home countries with weaker investor protection and less developed stock markets in the prereform period. The reforms also have a stronger effect on firms subject to less analyst following and greater external finance dependence. Finally, we find a stronger association between cross-listing activities and institutional ownership after the reforms. Taken together, this study increases understanding of the trade-off between cross-border capital supply and demand. Our finding suggests that country-level corporate governance plays an important role in facilitating the supply of cross-border capital, which in turn incentivizes firms to cross-list. Our study also offers policy implications for national stock exchanges and securities regulators by suggesting that countries without well-developed capital markets should strengthen their corporate governance to improve firms' ability to raise external financing and attract cross-border capital flows.