We examine how the relationship between competition and risk-taking changes with the ex ante bank equity capital ratio. We show that competition in the banking market, on average, mitigates risk-taking by banks. This relationship, however, can be altered by a bank’s ex ante equity capital ratio. More specifically, when face with increased competition, banks with low ex ante equity capital ratios engage in relatively larger reductions in risk-taking. They do so primarily by decreasing the risk in their lending portfolios. In contrast, banks with high enough ex ante equity capital ratios might not reduce their risk-taking at all.

We show that banks significantly underreport the risk in their trading book when they have lower equity capital. Specifically, a decrease in a bank’s equity capital results in substantially more violations of its self-reported risk levels in the following quarter. Underreporting is especially frequent during the critical periods of high systemic risk and for banks with larger trading operations. We exploit a discontinuity in the expected benefit of underreporting present in Basel regulations to provide further support for a causal link between capitalsaving incentives and underreporting. Overall, we show that banks’ self-reported risk measures become least informative precisely when they matter the most.

We examine the effects of secondary market liquidity on firm value and the IPO decision. Competitive aftermarket liquidity provision is associated with reduced welfare and a discounted secondary market price that can dissuade IPOs. The competitive market fails in particular for firms or at times when uncertainty regarding fundamental value and asymmetric information are large in combination. In these cases, firm value and welfare are improved by a contract where the firm engages a designated market maker to enhance liquidity. Such contracts represent a market solution to a market imperfection, particularly for small, growth firms.

We exploit a discontinuity in the New York Stock Exchange Designated Market Maker (DMM) contract to identify causal effects of DMM participation on equilibrium market outcomes. We document that contractual features that enhance DMM participation are associated with increased depth, narrower bid-ask spreads, and higher rates of price improvement, with most of the improvements attributable to increases in liquidity provision on markets other than the NYSE. These results cannot be attributed to the mechanical effects of the contractual changes and support the interpretation that market making is characterized by strategic complementarity. Received October 7, 2017; editorial decision December 10, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We show that banks significantly underreport the risk in their trading book when they have lower equity capital. Specifically, a decrease in a bank’s equity capital results in substantially more violations of its self-reported risk levels in the following quarter. Underreporting is especially frequent during the critical periods of high systemic risk and for banks with larger trading operations. We exploit a discontinuity in the expected benefit of underreporting present in Basel regulations to provide further support for a causal link between capital-saving incentives and underreporting. Overall, we show that banks’ self-reported risk measures become least informative precisely when they matter the most. Received April 30, 2015; editorial decision October, 27 2016 by Editor Itay Goldstein.