When the fraction of a firm's cash held overseas is greater, its shareholders value that cash lower. This goes beyond a pure tax effect: the repatriation tax friction disrupts the firm's internal capital market, distorting its investment policy. Firms underinvest domestically and overinvest abroad. Our findings are more pronounced when firms are subject to higher repatriation tax rates, higher costs of borrowing, and more agency problems. Overall, our evidence suggests that a combination of taxes, financing frictions, and agency problems leads to a valuation discount for foreign cash and documents real effects of how foreign earnings are taxed.

We find that acquirers create higher shareholder returns when advised by investment banks with more experience in the target industry. This finding is stronger when acquirers face more difficulties understanding and evaluating the targets. Further analyses show that these banks help acquirers avoid overpaying for targets and thus capture more of the deal synergy rather than making deals generating higher synergy. Our results are robust to controlling for an exhaustive set of determinants of acquirer returns and an identification strategy that exploits exogenous shocks to the supply of investment banks with target-industry experience.

We show that prior social connections can mitigate hold-up in bilateral relationships and encourage relation-specific investment and cooperation when contracts are incomplete. We examine vertical relationships and show that relation-specific innovative activities by suppliers increase with the existence and strength of prior social connections between the suppliers’ managers and board members and those of their customers. To establish causality, we exploit connection breaches due to manager/director retirements or deaths and find that innovation drops for affected suppliers after the departure of socially connected individuals relative to unaffected suppliers. Our work sheds light on how social connections can shape firm boundaries.

When the fraction of a firm’s cash held overseas is greater, its shareholders value that cash lower. This goes beyond a pure tax effect: the repatriation tax friction disrupts the firm’s internal capital market, distorting its investment policy. Firms underinvest domestically and overinvest abroad. Our findings are more pronounced when firms are subject to higher repatriation tax rates, higher costs of borrowing, and more agency problems. Overall, our evidence suggests that a combination of taxes, financing frictions, and agency problems leads to a valuation discount for foreign cash and documents real effects of how foreign earnings are taxed. Received January 19, 2015; editorial decision September 22, 2016 by Editor David Denis.

We show that credit default swap (CDS) trading on a firm's debt positively influences its technological innovation output measured by patents and patent citations. This positive effect is more pronounced in firms relying more on debt financing or being more subject to continuous monitoring by lenders prior to CDS trade initiation. Moreover, after CDS trade initiation, firms pursue more risky and original innovations and generate patents with higher economic value. Further analysis suggests that CDSs improve borrowing firms’ innovation output by enhancing lenders’ risk tolerance and borrowers’ risk- taking in the innovation process, rather than by increasing Research and Development (R&D) investment. Taken together, our findings reveal the real effects of CDSs on companies’ investments and technological progress.