Unemployed households’ access to unsecured revolving credit more than tripled over the last three decades. This article analyses how both cyclical fluctuations and trend increases in credit access impact the business cycle. The main quantitative result is that credit expansions and contractions have contributed to moderately deeper and more protracted recessions over the last 40 years. As more individuals obtained credit from 1977 to 2010, cyclical credit fluctuations affected a larger share of the population and became more important determinants of employment dynamics. Even though business cycles are more volatile, newborns strictly prefer to live in the economy with growing, but fluctuating, access to credit markets.

We measure the distribution of welfare losses from non-competitive behaviour in the U.S. credit card industry during the 1970s and 1980s. The early credit card industry was characterized by regional monopolies. Ensuing legal decisions led to competitive reforms that resulted in greater, but still limited, oligopolistic competition. We measure the distributional consequences of these reforms by developing and estimating a heterogeneous agent, defaultable debt framework with oligopolistic lenders. The transition from monopoly to oligopolistic competition yields welfare gains equivalent to a one-time transfer worth $3,600 (in 2016 dollars) for the bottom decile of earners (roughly 50% of their annual income) versus $1,200 for the top decile of earners. As the credit market expands, low-income households benefit more since they rely disproportionately on credit to smooth consumption. Greater competition also explains rising bankruptcies, chargeoffs, and credit to income ratios. Lastly, we bound the welfare gains from competition by computing a perfectly competitive benchmark. Aggregate welfare gains are 40% larger from perfect competition but distributed similarly to oligopolistic competition.

This paper uses new data from the PSID to quantify the relative importance of negative equity versus ability to pay, in driving mortgage defaults between 2009 and 2013. These data allow us to construct household budgets sets that provide better measures of ability to pay. Changes in ability to pay have large estimated effects. Job loss has an equivalent effect on the propensity to default as a 35% decline in equity. Strategic motives are also found to be quantitatively important, as we estimate more than 38% of households in default could make their mortgage payments without reducing consumption.

We empirically establish that unemployed individuals maintain significant access to credit and that upon a layoff, the unconstrained borrow while the constrained default and delever. Motivated by these findings, we develop a theory of credit lines and labor income risk to analyze optimal transfers to the unemployed. Since credit lines offer fixed interest rates and limits, credit lines are unresponsive to layoffs and provide greater consumption insurance relative to when debt is repriced period by period. At US levels of credit lines, the government can optimally reduce transfers to the unemployed, whereas this is not true when debt is counterfactually repriced period by period.

How do consumer credit markets affect the allocation of workers to firms, output, and labour productivity? We address this question in two steps. First, we use new micro-data to estimate empirical elasticities of job search patterns to credit. Second, we estimate our novel theory of sorting under risk aversion to match these elasticities, and then we conduct aggregate counterfactuals. Empirically, we show that an increase in credit limits worth 10% of prior annual earnings allows individuals to take 0.33 weeks longer to find a job. Conditional on finding a job, they earn 1.85% more and work at higher paying firms. We also find that young and high-utilization individuals are more responsive to credit. Theoretically, we integrate risk aversion and borrowing into a model with worker and firm heterogeneity. We estimate the model to match our new empirical elasticities, and we then measure how the credit expansion from 1964 to 2004 affected sorting and output. Sorting improves as credit expands since constrained workers—in particular constrained, young, high human capital workers—find more capital-intensive jobs.

Many argue that minimum wages can prevent efficiency losses from monopsony power. We assess this argument in a general equilibrium model of oligopsonistic labor markets with heterogeneous workers and firms. We decompose welfare gains into an efficiency component that captures reductions in monopsony power and a redistributive component that captures the way minimum wages shift resources across people. The minimum wage that maximizes the efficiency component of welfare lies below $8.00 and yields gains worth less than 0.2% of lifetime consumption. When we add back in Utilitarian redistributive motives, the optimal minimum wage is $11 and redistribution accounts for 102.5% of the resulting welfare gains, implying offsetting efficiency losses of −2.5%. The reason a minimum wage struggles to deliver efficiency gains is that with realistic firm productivity dispersion, a minimum wage that eliminates monopsony power at one firm causes severe rationing at another. These results hold under an EITC and progressive labor income taxes calibrated to the U.S. economy.

We examine how consumer credit affects entrepreneurship by linking three million earnings and pass-through tax records to credit reports. In the cross-section, we show that self-employment without employees and employer firm ownership increase monotonically with credit limits and credit scores. We then isolate individuals who have had discrete increases in credit limits after the exogenous removal of bankruptcy flags to measure the effects of personal credit on entrepreneurship. Following bankruptcy flag removal, individuals are more likely to start a new employer business and borrow extensively. Those who own businesses with employees borrow $40,000 more after bankruptcy flag removal, a 33% gain relative to the sample average.

We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’ local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor’s share of income between 1977 and 2013.

For whom has earnings risk changed, and why? We answer these questions by combining the Kalman filter and EM algorithm to estimate persistent and temporary earnings for every individual at every point in time. We apply our method to administrative earnings linked with survey data. We show that since the 1980s, persistent earnings risk rose by 12.5 percent for both employed and unemployed workers and the scarring effects of unemployment doubled. At the same time, temporary earnings risk declined. Using education and occupation codes, we show that rising persistent earnings risk is concentrated among high-skill workers and related to technology adoption.

We measure how patent publication affects innovation by exploiting the American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA), which accelerated public disclosure of US patents by about 1.5 years. We obtain causal estimates by comparing US patents subject to AIPA with “twin” European patents that were not. Post-AIPA, US patents receive more and faster follow-on citations, indicating greater technology diffusion. Technological overlap increases between distant but related patents and decreases between highly similar patents, and patent applications are less likely to be abandoned, suggesting less duplicative R&D. Publicly listed firms exposed to 1 standard deviation longer patent grant delays increased R&D by 4% post-AIPA.