We investigate the long-term effect of the Asian financial crisis on corporate cash holdings in 8 East Asian countries. The Asian firms build up cash holdings by decreasing investment activities after the crisis. We find that the increase in cash holdings is not explained by changes in firm characteristics but by changes in the firms’ demand function for cash, which indicates that the crisis has systematically changed the firms’ cash-holding policies. Specifically, the firms’ increased sensitivity to cash flow volatility is one of the main factors explaining the higher level of their cash holdings in the postcrisis period.

Some Korean business groups, or chaebols, have a large stake in securities firms that issue analysts’ reports on their member companies. This structure is unique in that industrial companies and securities firms are affiliated and operate within the same group. We investigate the informational content of earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices made by the chaebol-affiliated analysts, using data collected between 2000 and 2008. The chaebol analysts tend to make more optimistic earnings forecasts for the member companies. The mean EPS forecast error (5.36%) of the affiliated analysts for the same chaebol company are significantly larger than that (3.23%) of other chaebol and independent analysts. The chaebol analysts also assign better recommendations by almost one level and set target prices 2.5% higher to the member companies after controlling for company and analyst characteristics. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that chaebol analysts’ reports are biased by conflicts of interest. Stock market reactions do not differ in response to announcements of stock recommendations issued by affiliated vs. non-affiliated analysts. This suggests that capital markets do not recognize the conflicts of interest inherent in chaebol analysts’ reports.