This paper examines the consequences of adopting ASC 606, a new revenue recognition standard, on revenue uncertainty and debt contracting, using a quasi-natural experiment surrounding its adoption. We find that affected firms experience an increase in revenue uncertainty, as indicated by both higher analyst forecast dispersion and absolute analyst forecast error. Consequently, the cost of debt rises for affected firms, as covenants are used less in debt contracts reflecting a decreased effectiveness of earnings-based covenants. The effect is mitigated by relationship lending. We also show that the decreased use of earnings-based covenants as well as the increased cost of debt dissipate over time, while the increase in revenue uncertainty persists. Our analyses document a costly transition toward a more principles-based accounting standard but also suggest that some costs are transient.

We document significant increases in the suspension of ongoing drug projects following the passage of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), which mandates that pharmaceutical companies publicly disclose detailed clinical study results. Our results suggest a causal interpretation through difference-in-differences analyses that exploit variations in pre-FDAAA information environments. We also show evidence that fewer new projects are initiated after the FDAAA. Drug developers’ learning from peer failures is the primary mechanism, further amplified by financial constraints. We also examine the consequences of enhanced information disclosure, including changes in firm investment efficiency, drug quality, and disease morbidity.