The current assets and current liabilities of a firm are the stock reflections of closely interrelated operational and financial cash flows. The net effect of these combined flows must be recognized in searching for the optimal credit, inventory, or short-term borrowing policies. Yet, the vast majority of models for short-term investment and borrowing decisions do not allow for the interrelationships of this system.

Accounting changes, Discretionary accounting decisions, Management turnover, Earnings management

* Assistant Professor, University of Florida. author wishes to thank Professors Bodenhorn, Greenball, and Livingstone of Ohio State University for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. This paper is part of Gerald L. Salamon, Comparison of the Accounting and Internal Rates of of Firms With Nonnegative Growth Rates and Infinitive Lives, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1971. 'R. S. Carlson, Measuring Period Profitability: Book Yield Versus True Yield, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1964. M. N. Greenball, Appraising Methods of Accounting for Accelerated Tax Depreciation: A Relative Accuracy Approach, Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1969), pp. 26289. G. C. Harcourt, The Accountant in a Golden Age, Oxford Economic Papers, March 1965, pp. 66-80. J. L. Livingstone and G. L. Salamon, Relationship Between the Accounting and the Internal Rate of Measures: A Synthesis and An Analysis, Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1970), pp. 199-216. E. Solomon, Return on Investment: Relation of Book Yield to True Yield, Research in Accounting Measurement, ed. R. K. Jaedicke, Y. Ijiri, and O. Nielsen (Menasha, Wise.: American Accounting Association, 1966), pp. 232-44. 2 scope of this investigation will be restricted to the research which is cited in footnote 1. In order to avoid the frequent repetition of several authors' names we will use the term prior to denote that group of researchers whose work is cited in the footnote 1. 'Ezra Solomon, Alternative Rate of Concepts .. ., op. cit., p. 68.

IN The general theory of employment, interest and money we can discover what gives a book eternal youth. It is the quality of imperishable relevance to the essential, insoluble problems of time-bound humanity. A problem solved, a situation resolved into its ultimate constituents, a veil finally and irrevocably withdrawn, is the end of a matter. can salute the author who did these things, but we can no longer look into a living face and see our own enigmas and perplexities reflected there. Keynes's book, however, is a great enigma; it is the image of the vaster enigma of conduct, decision, and history itself. It is doubtless paradoxical to say that Keynes's book achieves its triumph by pointing out that the problems it is concerned with are essentially beyond solution. The business of scholars, scientists and philosophers is to gain and give understanding. But only the best of them tell us that they can describe only the shadows in the mouth of the cave. All problems are solvable, the characteristic stance of our civilization, afflicts us with a terrible myopia. If all problems are to be solvable, we must be very careful what kinds of thing we admit to the category of problems. They must be carefully tailored to fit our selfassumed omni-competence. The task which suits us, which we can do with astounding ingenuity and surprising effect, is that of analysis, the application of reason to the dismemberment of a body of information declared or assumed to be self-sufficient, and its re-constitution into a prescription for conduct. It is the selfsufficiency of such supposed bodies of information which removes them so immeasurably far from the harsh truth of things. Why was not Keynes satisfied with the Treatise? It had the Keynesian touch. It knotted up a mass of perplexities and cut them with one Alexandrine stroke. The Fundamental Equations were extremely concise and ostensibly simple. Had Myrdal been at Keynes's elbow to interpret the dream, they would have done the trick, thrown back the bolt and enabled the gates to swing open upon an undiscovered country. What was wanted was some clue to the nature of the inducement to invest. Keynes in the Treatise sought for it in a WicksellianAustrian theory of the nature of capital. (If one draws a diagram of what Keynes says about capital in the Treatise, there will appear a Hayekian triangle of the stages of production.) But this did not seem to go quite to the heart of the matter. What, in its essential nature, was the Natural Rate of Interest? This was the difficulty, the source of dissatisfaction, that led to a fresh attempt as soon as the Treatise was published. The General theory devotes a whole Book to the Inducement to Invest. The apparatus is the confrontation with each other of the Marginal Efficiency of Capital and the rate of interest. What is the M.E.C.? learn its real nature in Section V of Chapter 11. It depends on expectation. And what does expectation depend on? To find that stated, with full uncompromising explicitness, we have to look in a part of the canon which few economists seem able to endure the sight of-or else they have never heard of it. It is his reply to his critics. It appeared in the Quarterly Journal of Economics for February 1937, and it declares unequivocally that expectations do not rest on anything solid, determinable, demonstrable. We simply do not know. The General theory is a detour. (Is everything in economics a detour?) It is a detour from a path which might have led direct from the Treatise to the Q.J.E. article. Keynes and many of the readers of the Treatise were worried about how investment and saving could differ from each other. The dilemma needed only the same liberating insight that can ex-

The FTC reported 22, 517 corporate acquisitions during the 1960s compared with 7200 for the period, 1940–1959. The increased employment of this method of corporate growth has generated a number of studies explaining certain segments of the merger movement. Attempts have been made to explain why firms merge, how firms merge, and how mergers have affected subsequent performance of firms. Mergers have been described as consummated to avoid bankruptcy (for the acquired firm), to capitalize upon managerial inefficiencies, to gain from valuation discrepancies, to achieve portfolio diversification, and for synergistic purposes and many other reasons.

In their present paper. Professors Cheng and Deets (hereafter C-D) attempt to derive a measure of instantaneous systematic risk for securities and portfolios which is consistent with the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin capital asset pricing model when the true market horizon is infinitesimally short. In so doing, they assert that Jensen's resolution of the horizon problem for such a market horizon is incorrect. In the comments which follow, I shall attempt first to indicate explicitly the causes for the differences in the Jensen and C–D results, and second, to evaluate their relative merits.

Shelby L. Brumelle, Bernhard Schwab, Capital Budgeting with Uncertain Future Opportunities: A Markovian Approach, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan., 1973), pp. 111-122

THE USE OF the geometric distributed lag in economics is widespread. The Liviatan [6] method for estimating its parameters is simple and provides consistent estimates. Moreover, it can be used to provide initial estimates for more sophisticated techniques [2]. Not much is known about the statistical properties of these estimators, especially their small sample properties. We do know that their asymptotic efficiencies are inferior to most alternatives [1], and recently Nagar and Gupta [7] have provided approximations to the small sample biases. The purpose of this note is to derive a simple way of displaying the Liviatan estimators which makes their nature clear and which allows the small sample distribution of one of them to be easily deduced. The main result is that the estimator of the parameter which defines the geometric distributed lag is a ratio of two ordinary least squares estimators. With this and the assumption that the error terms form a sequence of independent, identically distributed normal variables, it is possible, using the work of Geary [4], to derive the small sample distribution of this estimator. This result forms the main part of this note, which concludes with a brief discussion of the problem of setting confidence limits along the lines suggested by Fieller [3].

The concepts of conditional risk aversion, the conditional risk premium, and risk independence pertaining to multiattributed utility functions are defined. The latter notion is then generalized to what is called utility independence. A number of theorems useful for simplifying the assessment of multiattributed utility functions given certain risk independence and utility independence assumptions are stated.

T HE response of government policy variables to the targets or objectives of policy has received increasing attention in the literature. All of the published studies have limited their investigations to the behavior of the monetary authority.1 This concern with the reaction function of the monetary authority can be traced to three factors: (1) Since the monetary authority is independent (or semiindependent) of the government, investigators have been concerned with whether the central bank has responded to the appropriate social objectives such as price stability and full employment; (2) Central banks have often expressed concern with short-run objectives (such as interest rate stability) and investigators have examined whether the pursuit of such objectives has hindered the implementation of the social goals; and (3) Econometric modelbuilders have become concerned with the statistical problems arising from the endogeneity of policy.2 This paper reports on an attempt at estimating the reaction function of the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Both FNMA and the FHLBS are governmentsponsored agencies (the FHLBS being under more government control than FNMA) whose major objective concerns the mortgage market and housing activity. FHLBS makes loans (advances) to savings and loan associations which, in turn, use the funds for mortgage loans. FNMA buys (or sells) mortgages in the secondary market. During the 1960's these operations were aimed primarily at stabilizing the volume of mortgage credit with the implicit view towards stabilizing housing activity.3 There were a number of factors during the 1960's which might have prevented the FHLBS and FNMA from pursuing their objective of minimizing the variability in mortgage flows and housing starts. First, before 1968, FNMA purchases and sales of mortgages appeared in the United States budget, hence mortgage purchases, in particular, were carefully examined since such purchases added to the deficit. After 1968 this was no longer true since FNMA was made a private corporation and taken out of the federal budget. During the credit squeeze of 1966 the Johnson Administration placed severe restrictions on the debt issues of various government agencies, including the FHLBS. In effect, this meant that the FHLBS was not free to decide to raise funds to lend to savings and loan associations without severe scrutiny. In the next section, two alternative models of FHLBS behavior are derived within a utility function framework. Empirical estimates of the alternative reaction functions are presented. same is done for FNMA behavior in a subsequent section. remainder of the paper presents the implications of the results for a number of issues, including: (1) whether FNMA and the FHLBS have, indeed, used Received for publication June 29, 1972. Revision accepted for publication December 13, 1972. * author wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. views expressed are not necessarily shared by the FHLBS. He also thanks M. J. Hamburger, S. M. Goldfeld, and an anonymous referee for their comments. 1See, for example, H. G. Johnson and W. G. Dewald, Analysis of the Objectives of in D. Carson (ed.), Banking and Studies, Irwin Inc., 1963; and J. H. Wood, Model of Federal Reserve Behavior, in George Horwich (ed.), Process and Policy, Irwin Inc., 1967. 2See F. de Leeuw and J. Kalchbrenner, Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization-Comment, in Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, April, 1969, and the Reply by L. C. Anderson and J. L. Jordon in same issue. 3See Harry Schwartz, The Role of Government-Sponsored Intermediaries in the Mortgage Market, in Housing and Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, 1970; and Ernest Bloch, The Federal Home Loan Bank System, in Federal Credit Agencies, Commission on Money and Credit, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963.